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ABSTRACT 
In basing the school curriculum on the view that some 
value can be attributed to knowledge most arguments have 
centred on either the contingent consequences of studying 
particular disciplines, the claim that knowledge can be 
differentiated into distinct forms and that all students 
should be introduced to them, or the claim that some 
knowledge can be valued for its own sake or for its power 
in developing the mind. In the case of mathematics 
common justifications given for teaching it are that it is 
useful, that it promotes intellectual development or that 
it is intrinsically worthwhile. 
/ But a recent view argues that some knowledge is 
I 
(i) 
valuable because it provides people with such an understand-
ing that allows them to reflect on questions concerning the 
nature and meaning of life and to be in a position to best 
determine what they will do with their lives. The role 
that mathematics plays here is investigated by an examin-
ation of the nature and foundations of mathematical 
knowledge. Dominant views on mathematics have nearly all 
stressed its a priori nature but they all have serious 
objections to them. By a comparison with vi·ews on the 
nature of scientific change a recent view on the nature of 
mathematical knowledge has been articulated that describes 
it to be in a process of evolution. At any particular 
time there exists a mathematical prac~ice which consists of 
a language component, a metamathematical view component, 
and sets of accepted reasonings, questions and statements. 
The mathematical pra~tice of today has evolved from a set 
of beliefs about simple manipulations of physical objects 
and consists of idealized ways of operating on the world. 
It is concluded that while all students should be 
introduced to the minimal mathematical language that is 
useful to everyone they should also come to understand 
the cultural significances of mathematics as it has 
evolved through.man's attempts to solve problems within 
his environment. This comes through a study of the 
influences that mathematics has had on different cultures 
and the way that man has looked to mathematics as 
providing a method of solution to problems within his 
culture. Unlike earlier justifications given for 
teaching mathematics the justification based on the 
cultural significances of mathematics centres on al~ fiY.e 
components of the mathematical practice of tae day and 
provides important considerations for the structure and 
presentation of mathematics courses in schools. 
\11/ 
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CHAPTER I 
THE PROBLEM OF THE PLACE OF MATHEMATICS ON THE CURRICULUM 
Nature of the Problem 
Whenever there is debate over the purposes of education 
and the value of particular educational activities, it becomes 
important to look at the traditional subject disciplines, like 
mathematics, and the claims made for their placement on the 
curriculum. For in the case of mathematics, the value 
judgements we make regarding such things as reforms to 
traditional curricula, the selection of mathematical topics, 
and the best methods of instruction, are all related to the 
fundamental concerns of why we value mathematical knowledge and 
the justification we can give for teaching mathematics in 
schools. 
In a discussion on the aims of teaching mathematics at a 
meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of 
Science, held at Glasgow in 1901, a Professor J. Perry said: 
The·etudy-of Mathematics_began because it was 
useful, continues because it is useful and is 
valuable to the world because of the useful-
ness of its results, while the mathematicians, 
who determine what the teacher will do, hold 
that the subject should be studied for its own 
sake. -
(Quoted in Griffiths and Howson, 1974, p. 17) 
1. 
Seventy years later there was no apparent change in the purposes 
of studying mathematics, as the Assistant Masters Association in 
England said: 
There is a twofold p.urpose in the study of 
mathematics. Firstly, and of prime importance, 
is the pursuit of the subject for its own worth • 
••• Secondly, ••• we must regard mathematics as 
a study of a service subject to science, 
technology, commerce, politics and 
economics, and even the arts. 
(Assistant Masters Association, 1973, p. 205) 
More recently, the justifications given for the teaching of 
mathematics have increased in number though great importance 
is still attached to the usefulness to which the knowledge can 
be put. As K. Selkirk says: 
The teaching.,of mathematics in'-sc-hools may 
be- justified ·in a number of ways. It is, 
for ~xample, part of the cultural background 
of our civilisation, and as such should rank 
with art, music, literature and similar 
aspects of our heritage. Again it is a 
logical and efficient system of deduction and 
this may well transfer-to problems outside 
the immediate area of the subject. The 
justification which appeals particularly to 
those whose primary interests lie outside the 
subject is_, however, that it is useful. At 
a time when the limitations of our pational 
and global resource~ are only too painfully 
apparent, this usefulness must be a major 
justification for the teaching of-the subject 
in schools and for its important share in the 
total.school curriculum. 
(In M. Cornelius (ed.) , 1982, p. -186) 
But these comments leave important problems unresolved. 
While we might agree, for example, that all students should be 
taught the mathematics that will be useful to them later on in 
life, we are still left with the problem of deciding what 
mathematics is useful to all people. It might be that the 
amount of mathematics that is useful to_all people is so 
minimal that it requires very little time at all on the 
curriculum. And if we are to argue that .students should be 
taught the mathematics that will be, useful to them in their 
future occupations then we -must confront the problem of 
predicting the future fo~ these students and deciding whether 
the mathematical knowledge they need is. ·not better taught "on 
the job" or in specific -vocational trainin9 institutions. 
2. 
The claim that mathematics should be studied for its own 
sake is unclear. Does it mean that people enjoy studying 
I 
mathematics and that, therefore, it is worthwhile pursuing_? 
If so, how does one answer the student who says that he 
doesn't enjoy studying it and that, therefore, it is not 
worthwhile? If one is to claim that, irrespective of any 
preference of the learner, mathematics is an intrinsically 
worthwhile activity and should be studied by all students, 
' thert we must decide on what makes it intrinsically worth-
while. Why can we claim that mathematical knowledge is 
valuable to all people without any reference to the use to 
which they can put that knowledge? 
If it is claimed that mathematics should be studied by 
all students because it develops the mind and promotes 
intellectual development, then it must be clearly established 
in what ways mathematical knowledge is neces.sary for 
intellectual development to proceed. Are all paths to 
intellectual development, for example, dependent upon a 
certain minimal training in mathematics? 
Finally, if mathematics is ranked with activities like 
art, music and literature, then why is this sufficient reason 
for requiring all students to study it at school? Why 
should schools be concerned about the cultural significances 
of mathematics? 
The answers to these questions are important because the 
reasons we give for teaching mathematics in schools have 
implications for how we teach it as well as for the selection 
of content of mathematics courses. But a critical examin-
3. 
ation of the claims for the justi£ication for teaching 
mathematics must· be based on views·about the value of 
knowledge in general, and the nature and value of mathemat-
.'ical -knowledge in particular. Is there a strict dichotomy 
·of knowledge into that which is val,uable becaus·e of its 
extrinsic usefulness, and that-which is valuable because of 
-its intrinsic worthwhileness? Are there other value 
categories of knowledge and, if so, what are they? What 
is the nature of mathematical kn~w1edge? Why should 
mathematics constitute part of the compulsory curriculum? 
It is the purpose of--this dissertation to investigate these 
questions from the philosophical perspective and to argue 
for the inclusion of mathematics in the curriculum, based 
on a view of the·nature.of man, the nature of mathematical 
. -
knowledge, ·and the.cultural significances of mathematics. 
Such a view, it is shown,- will have radical implications 
for the mathematics. curriculum. 
Outline of the Argument 
Chapter II is concerned with arguments for basing the 
curriculum on particular notions of the worthwhileness .of 
knowledge. It considers the claim.that some subjects are 
valuable because of their contingent consequences, the claim 
that the areas of knowledge represented by certain subjects 
are distinct forms of knowledge, and the claim that some 
subjects themselves possess intrinsic worthwhileness. 
~inding objections to .all these views, an argument is then 
considered which rejects the dichotomy of knowledge into 
that which is instrumentally useful-and that which is 
4. 
intrinsically worthwhile; but which gives value to some 
knowledge in assisting people to acquire a 11 world view" and 
make reasoned decisions about what they will do with their 
lives. 
s. 
Given that argument it is then reasonable to ask what 
it is about mathematics that allows it to serve that purpose. 
So Chapter III is related to questions concerning the nature 
and foundations of mathematics. The dominant 20th century 
views on the nature of mathematics, stemming from the· 
earlier works of philosophers such as Leibniz and Kant and 
even back earlier to Plato and Aristotle, are all found to 
have serious objections to t:nem. This is because, it is 
argued, they all regard mathematics as something that is 
unchanging with time. A recent thesis is presented which 
considers mathematics to be'in a process.of evolution and 
constituting a particular element of the culture at a 
particular time. This view then provides the basis for an 
examination of the cultural significances of mathematics. 
In Chapter IV some of the common justifications given 
for teaching mathematics are considered; namely, that it is 
useful, that it is intrinsically worthwhile, and that it 
promotes intellectual development. These justifications are · 
found to be inadequate. A justification based on the 
cultural significances of mathematics is then presented 
together with some important considerations for school 
mathematics courses. 
CHAPTER II 
THE VALUE OF KNOWLEDGE 
The aim of this chapter is to show the development of an 
argument which contends that we can choose a curriculum based 
on a particular notion of the worthwhileness of knowledge. 
In the first section the case for such an argument is 
established by considering firstly the views of those who 
maintain that such judgements of worthwhileness cannot or 
should not be made. Then there follows an examination of the 
utilitarian view that the promotion of happiness is the sole 
criterion under which man's actions, including curriculum 
choice, are to be judged worthwhile or not; and the 
pragmatist's view that sees knowledge as something that is 
acquired by man as he struggles to control his environment. 
Finally, in this section, consideration is given to the view 
that while educators should not make final judgements of 
worthwhileness.they should, in fact, design the curriculum in 
such a way that enables students to do so. 
All these arguments are found to have objections to them 
and so the fo·llowing section considers various attempts mad,e 
.by theorists to give some value to knowledge and which should 
serve as a basis for curriculum design. The first approach 
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· considered is one which attributes worthwhileness to certain 
subjects based on the contingent consequences of those subjects; 
the contingent consequences being a list of specific objectives 
that, it is argued, students ought to attain. The second 
approach considers the justification for a curriculum based on . 
a view of knowledge that distinguishes distinct forms of 
knowledge. It is claimed that the curriculum should be 
designed so as to introduce students to these distinct forms. 
A third approach is to claim that some subjects possess 
intrinsic worthwhileness and so they are to be valued for 
their own sake. Some subjects might be deemed intrinsically 
worthwhile, for example, because they_ involve a higher degree 
of intellectual functioning or because they are concerned 
with truth and rationality. 
All the views are found to be inadequate as they stand 
and a~ argument is ~hen presented which contends that we are 
wrong to regard all knowledge as being either instrumentally 
. 
useful or as an end in itself. Some knowledge, it is argued, 
is valuable because it helps people determine their own ends 
by acquiring an understanding of things in a way that allows 
them to make reasoned decisions about what aims to set 
themselves and_ what th_ey are to do with their lives. 
Furthermore, the knowledge that does that, it is claimed, is 
found in the traditional disciplines as they have evolved 
across generations and cultures and with the contributions of 
many scholars in the various fields. 
This argument then provides the basis for a critical 
examination of the traditional subject disciplines, like 
mathematics, in ~rder to elucidate their nature and their 
influence within different societies and cultures, and to 
consider what implications this might have for the curriculum. 
7. 
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Establishing the Argument 
(i) There is a view of values, found in the works of 
philosophers like David Hume in the 18th century and A.J. Ayer 
in the 20th century, that considers all value judgements to be 
simply expressions of emotion. Hurne maintained that reason 
alone cannot decide moral questions but that most people have 
a "moral sentiment" that is used to make decisions. The 
moral sentiment is pleasant if it is a feeling-of approval and 
unpleasant if it is one of disapproval. Ayer's view, first 
argued in 1936, is that statements which cannot be verified by 
observation or analysis have no meaning. True statements are 
verifiable propositions and statements which are not verifiable 
are meaningless. Therefore, there is no way to decide between 
different value judgements. To say ''.stealing is wrong 11 is 
simply to express a feeling and the statement cannot be proven 
in any sense si~ce it contains no verifiable proposition. 
Ayer maintains that this same analysis holds for all types of 
value judgements. 
This emotivist view then, in relation to questions of 
curriculum, would maintain that there is no rational basis for 
choosing the elements of a curriculum. To say that something 
ought to be included in the curriculum is simply to express a 
feeling that others may or may not have. No reasons can be 
given, however, to justify such inclusion. 
But while it may be difficult to find reasons for including 
something in the curriculum, this is not to say that there are 
none and the emotivist's point of view does have certain flaws 
within it. 
9. 
Firstly, it is possible for our emotions and qur value 
judgements not to coincide. One can say, "I feel like doing 
something but I know it is wrong", or "I don't want to do 
this but I know I ought to." While .some emotivists might 
simply claim that there is a conflict of emotions here, it 
would seem that such occasions ought not to arise if our value 
judgements were just a reflection of our emotions. Secondly, 
we recognize that our emotions can change over time, whereas 
the value judgements we are attempting to make are based upon 
premises that we believe are unchangeable. When we make the 
value judgement that to steal is wrong, we are implying that 
it always will be, even if in the future in a particular 
situation, under the influence of drugs say, we adopt the 
attitude that to steal is an acceptable form of behaviour. 
Thirdly, the emotivist's philosophy is based upon the judge-
ment of the truth of propositions in only two ways, by 
observations and analysis. But there is ·no reason to accept 
that these·- are the only ways of attesting to the truth of all 
propositions. The emotivist has not shown, for example, 
that there cannot be reasoning about values. 
(ii) The argument that one ought not to decide what goes 
into a curriculum is closely allied with the general area of 
what is called "child-centred" education. It is -based upon 
a particular view of the child and the right of the child to 
determine what he or she will study. 
J.J. Rousseau's thinking, for example, is reflected in 
his fictionalised account of the child Emile, published in 
., 
1762, and involves· an analogy with nature. Rousseau argues 
that if left to ·himself Emile will become what nature 
intended him to become. No coercion nor prompting is 
needed, but only support. If nurtured correctly Emile will 
grow up to be physically and intellectually what was ideally 
intended for him at birth. To direct. his thinking in any 
.LU• 
way would be "to substitute authority for reason in his mind" 
and make him "the victim of other people's opinions" 
(Quoted in Boyd, 1956, p. 73). Late+, Friedrich Froebe! 
(see Lilley, (ed.) 1967) expanded Rousseau's views to 
develop a direct analogy with nature. The teachers in 
charge of their pupils should be like gardeners tending their 
plants, providing them with the best possible environment for 
growth and then allowing nature to follow its course. 
A.S. Neill was not only a writer but also a practitioner 
in the field o{ education and his school, Summer.hill,_ was 
meant to reflect his educational thought. His arguments 
centre around the freedom of the child to learn. It is the 
right of the child to choose what and when to study. This 
rigqt of the child outweighs any arguments claiming the 
worthwhileness of studying a particular subject at a 
particular time. If the child wishes to study the subject 
then he will decide when to do so. 
There are criticisms, however, which can be directed 
towards the views of writers such as Rousseau, Froebe! and 
Neill. Firstly, as for the analogy with growing plants, it 
is easy to see a flower or a plant grow with the minimum of 
guidance and to explain that it is nature's way. It is 
very easy, but misleading, to say the same should be so of 
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human beings, both physically and intellectually. The 
knowledge, attitudes and skills that can be acquired by a 
child in society do not occur naturally. The culture that 
man has created is very complex and deliberate guidance 
into it is required. To allow "nature's way" and not to 
attempt to direct his passage into society, is to leave the 
child open to detrimental influences. Secondly, if one 
does have reasoned views on what a child ought to know and 
knowledge of the capabilities of the child, and i"f one has 
reasoned views on how knowledge ought to be attained, then 
.one should attempt to make certain that such knowledge is 
acquired. To allow the child always to make decisions on 
what and when to study leaves the child open to a choice 
based upon a misunderstanding of the available possibilities. 
(iii) The premise of utilitarianism is that what matters 
most is a world in which everyone is happy·. Therefore, 
man's actions ought to be about minimizing pain and 
maximizing pleasure. This philosophy was developed in the 
1800s by Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill and one recent 
educationalist, Robin Barrow, has based his educational 
thoughton the utilitarian premise: 
Education should seek to develop 
individuals in such a way that they are 
in a position to gain happiness for 
themselves, while contributing to the 
happiness of others, in a social 
setting that is designed to maintain and 
promote the happiness oe all so far as 
possible. 
(Barrow, 1976, p. 84) 
Barrow does not believe that an ideal state will be 
attained where everybody achieves maximum pleasure, as he 
points out in answering critics such as Macintyre (1964). 
What matters is that man ought to be striving for such a 
state of affairs and that when decisions have to be made 
they ought to be based on the utilitarian premise. 
Apart from the fact that the ideal state is not with 
us and may never be with us there are other difficulties 
with the utilitarian premise. Firstly, in claiming that 
pleasure should be distributed among all men, rather than a 
small number of men being supremely happy, the utilitarian 
'is claiming that he attaches importance to the principle of 
distributive justice. Barrow admits this, but in so doing 
he clearly values this principle too and not just the sum 
total of human happiness. 
Secondly, since utilitarians claim their premise to be 
true, and not just something to be arbitrarily -accepted'· 
they also commit themselves to valuing the truth as well as 
happiness. 
Some utilitarians also get into difficulties when they 
claim that some activities, such as studying science, are 
more valuable than others, such as playing darts, given that 
each activity promotes the same amount of pleasure. A 
person m'.3-y be drawn to pursue a -Certain activity.be.cause he 
feels it is important in some way. He-may feel as if 
pursuing a particular scientific project is important, for 
example, because it will help him solve problems that·he 
believes ought to be solved. Such problems may not even be 
understood by the majority of people and their solution may 
contribute nothing to the sum total of the happiness of 
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society. So too a person may study philosophy because he 
believes it is helping him to answer questions that have 
concerned' him and that he feels he needs to answer. The 
time spent on such activities may give him little or no 
pleasure but he is still drawn to them. Some criterion, 
other than the utilitarian one, must be used to decide on 
the worth of these various activities, thus' contradicting 
the premise that maximizing pleasure is all that matters. 
The utilitarian premise is rejected then as the sole 
criterion for determining which subjects should constitute 
the curriculum. That is not to say that we do not value 
happiness, but that we do not accept that simply valuing 
happiness is enough· to select the content of the curriculum. 
We shall show the development of an argument which claims 
-some knowledge as being valuable for reasons other than 
simply promoting happiness. 
(iv) A wniter who has had a great impact upon educational 
practice in the 20th century is John Dewey. His pragmatic 
philosophy rejects the dichotomy between knowledge and 
experience. The pragmatist believes man's inte~ligence is 
a tool used by man to control his environment. To learn 
something significant about the wo~ld we must do more than 
operate logically upon what appear to be self-evident truths. 
We must transform the environment as a response to problems 
that need resolution. Thought does provide hypothetical 
ideas in response to the problems but these ideas are tested 
in action .• 
The process of learning from experience is thus an 
active process. The learner locates and defines a problem 
to be solved, collects pertinent data through observation 
and reasoning and decides on possible solutions before 
finally testing them. And for Dewey it is the quality of 
experience that is important. So in directing his comments 
to educators he says: 
It is his (the educator's] business to 
arrange for the kind of experiences 
which, while they do not repel the 
student, but rather engage his 
activities are, neverthele.ss, more than 
immediately enjoyable since they 
promote having desirable future 
experiences •••• Wholly independent of 
desire or intent, every experience 
lives on in further experiences. 
(Dewey, 1938, p. 16) 
For Dewey there is only one kind of knowledge; ·a 
knowledge that may be termed either moral or scientific. 
Moral science: 
••• is ineradicably emoirical, not 
theological nor metaphysical nor 
mathematical •••• Hence physics, 
chemistry, history, statistics, 
engineering science, are a part of 
disciplined moral knowledge so far as 
they enable us to understand the 
conditions and agencies through which 
man lives, and on account of which he 
forms and executes his plans. Moral 
science is not something with a 
separate province. It is physical, -
biological and historic knowledge placed 
in a human context where it will 
illuminate and guide the activities of 
men. 
(Dewey, 1922, pp. 295-6) 
So kndwledge itself nas no intrinsic worth. It is something 
that is acquired by man as he grapples with problems in his 
environment and eventually comes to solve these problems. 
.L~. 
There is no division into different types or forms of 
knowledge. There are no absolute or universal truths that 
are of different kinds. Experience and problem situations 
have forced man to use and develop the power of thought to 
control his environment. 
For pragmatists like Dewey then the curriculum is a 
process as much as a distinct body of subject matter. 
Dewey does not reject what might be called traditional 
disciplines such as mathematics and history, but claims 
that the student should draw upon his reflections in these 
areas to help solve the problems he has encountered. They 
have no usefulness in their own right, only in their ability 
to enrich the life of the student and enable him to solve 
the problems. 
Dewey's position and the pragmatic philosophy-in 
general do have serious objections,- however. Firstly, the 
pragmatist is in difficulties. because the reasoning behind 
his philosophical position is surely theoretical and not 
practical. It is difficult to see how he can arrive at a 
philosophical position other than through theoretical 
reasoning as distinct from practical reasoning. And yet 
this distinction is what the pragmatist disclaims. 
Secondly, in claiming that the quality of experience is 
important, Dewey says that the experience is meant to lead 
on to other rewarding experiences: 
Hence the central problem of an education 
based upon experience is to select the 
kind of present experiences that live 
fruitfully and creatively in subsequent 
experiences. 
(Dewey, 1938, pp. 16-17) 
Education can be identified with growth, not just physically 
but intellectually and morally. The objection is that one 
must specify the directionsin which present experiences will 
lead the learner. For isn't it also true that some people, 
such as criminals, may find some experiences rewarding for 
themselves but that do not appeal to the rest of the 
community? Dewey's answer to that is that while a man may 
acquire great skill as a criminal through a series of 
experiences the question is whether this will affect his 
growth in general: 
Does this form of growth create conditions 
for further growth, or does it set up 
conditions tha,t shut off the person who 
has grown in this particular direction 
from the occasions, stimuli and opport-
unities for continuing growth in new 
directions? What is the 'effect of growth 
in a special direction upon the attitudes 
and habits which alone 9pen up avenues for 
development in other lines? 
( ibid • ' p • 2 9 ) 
But even so it is difficult to see how the educator-, 
mindful Gf the fact that different experiences are conducive 
to growth in different directions, can escape making 
qualitative judgements. , Ultimately he must be able to 
decide between the worthwhileness of different experiences. 
Finally, ~t is difficult to see how all intellectual 
activities can follow the same J?attern of the experimental. 
sciences. How, for example, can history be fitted into the 
same experimental patterns? But whether it is true or not, 
it is necessary for the pragmatist to furnish reasons for 
regarding them as the same, just as it is necessary for 
those who claim there are distinct types of activities to 
show how they are distinct. 
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(v) A different approach has been adopted by J.P. :vhite 
in his book Towards a Compulsory Curriculum .(1973}, where he 
presents his argument that education ought-to be about 
providing people with the knowledge that enables them to 
make meaningful choices between different activities and 
different ways of life. Educators do no~ make the final 
judgement of worthwh·ileness but -design the-curriculum.to 
enable the students to do so. - Surprising1y, White bas.es 
his argument for a compulsory curriculum on the concept of 
liberty. "Any infringement of liberty is prima facie 
morally unjustifiable" (ib;__d_., p. 5}. But it is only 
prima f acie wrong to stop people doing what they want to do 
for there may· be. considerations which override this 
principle-.- So what is needed is an .examination of the 
.kinds of considerations which might .justify an interference 
with liberty. White claims that considerations of a 
person's own good as well as the good of others may justify 
such an interference • In relation to education: 
••• it·would be right to constrain a 
child to learn such and such only if (a) 
he is likely to be harmed if he does not 
do so, or (b) other people are likely to 
be harmed. 
(ibid.' p. 6) 
Case (a) is central.to White's _argument. 
The problem now is.to identify, from·all the possible 
activities to be understood by learning, those activities 
that are likely to harm the child if he is not constrained 
to learn them. To this end White makes an important 
distinction between the questions, "What kinds of activities 
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are worthwhile in themselves?" and "Wha't kinds of activities 
are educationally worthwhile?" History and mathematics may 
not be intrinsically valuable for everyone but they may be 
educationally valuable. The educational value of an 
activity is not determined by any value intrinsic to the 
activity itself but by the nature of the activity. 
White thus divides activities into two categories in 
which: 
(1) no understanding of what it is to 
want X is logically possible without 
engaging in X 
(2) some understanding of what ~t is to 
want X is logically possible without 
engaging in X. 
(ibid., p. 26) 
The activities of the first category must be part of a 
compulsory curriculum because if the student is not 
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compulsorily introduced to them he will have no understanding 
of what it is to study them and, therefore, will not be able 
to make a reasoned choice as to whether he will pursue them 
or not. In this category White includes subjects such as 
pure mathematics, communication in general, engaging in the 
(exact) physical sciences, appreciating works of art, and 
philosophizing. 
The same justification cannot be given for the activit-
ies of the second category, however, which includes speaking 
a foreign language, playing organized games, cookery, 
painting pictures and writing poetry, as examples. These 
activities are not compulsory but are offered only as 
options. While it is important for all students to know 
what these activities are, it is not necessary for students 
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to engage in them since this is not needed to understand 
what it is to want to pursue them. 
In his book White does consider some objections to the 
theory, such as whether it is clearly evident what activities 
belong to which category, and whether one is not simply 
advocating one's subjective preference for autonomy in 
designing the curriculum. But M.A.B. Degenhardt raises 
furthe·r serious objections to the theory. For the learner: 
Does not coming to understand any serious 
activity involve coming to feel something 
of its 'call' or 'urgency'? Would we 
not be sceptical of one who said 'Oh, I 
know what there is in.that poetry 
business (or science, or history, or 
music): I think I'll 'give it a miss'? 
Certainly it would be odd if someone said 
'In my early twenties I decided to be 
interested in philosophy'. For people 
just.do not relate to serious activities 
in this way. 
(Degenhardt, 1982~ p. 79) 
And for the teacher: 
It is generally thought that a good 
teacher must care passionately for his 
subject, evidencing this passion and 
getting pupils to share it. But who 
could sustain such passion if he saw 
himself as merely offering a smorgasbrod 
of pursuits to be sampled and then freely 
chosen or rejected? Does not good 
teaching presuppose a more positive 
conviction of the worth of what we teach? 
( ibid o I P o 8 Q ) 
Such comments call on us to rethink our views on knowledge 
and to establish what ultimate value we can give to it. Can 
knowledge be divided into two kinds; knowledge that is useful 
and knowledge that is intrinsically valuable in some way? 
Later, in this chapter, we see that this dichotomy is reje~ted 
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by Degenhardt; that it overlooks a third possibility, that 
some knowledge is not necessarily extrinsically useful nor 
intrinsically worthwhile, but is what Degenhardt calls 
"serious" or "significant" knowledge. Not only that, what 
makes it serious or significant is based on a view of the 
nature of man as well as a view of the nature of knowledge. 
Some knowledge is valuable because it serves a distinctively 
human enterprise. 
Contingent Consequences 
In the previous section we sought to establish the 
argument that we can choose a particular curriculum based on 
the worthwhileness of knowledge by considering the views of 
those who argue that such judgements are not possible or 
that they ought not- to be made. Such views were found 
wanting as they stand. In this section we consider the 
views of some who maintain that worthwhileness can be 
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attributed to certain disciplines, but that the worthwhile-
ness of such disciplines is related to the contingent 
consequences of pursuing them. In trying to be quite 
specific about the design of a curriculum, two recent 
writers have attempted to list a set of specific objectives 
that students ought to attain, and then to select those 
discipli?es which assist in the attainment of those specific 
objectives. Such a method has been adopted by s. Nisbet 
(1957) in his book Purpose in the Curriculum and by the 
highly influential Taxonomy of Educational Objectives edited 
by B.S. Bloom (1956). 
Nisbet classifies the "practical Objectives of education" 
that a teacher might realistically achieve into two groups. 
The first group, labelled "Adjustment to Environment", 
consists of skills, culture, home membership, occupation, 
leisure, and active citizenship. The second group, labelled 
"Personal Growth", consists of the physical, aesthetic, 
social, spiritual, intellectual, and moral development of the 
individual. 
Nisbet explains: 
Such a list is comprehensive enough to 
include most of what has been claimed as 
important in education, whatever the 
ultimate philosophy of those who make 
the claims, and yet detailed enough to 
provide guidance and illumination for 
the practical person, whatever specific 
functions he may have to perform. 
(Nisbet, 1~57, p. 14) 
He then examines the conventional curriculum subjects in turn 
and considers how many of the objectives are, in fact, 
contributed to by a study of. those subjects., 
Bloom's taxonomy is more detailed but the intention is 
the same as Nisbet's. Three domains are specified; the 
cognitive, the affective, and the psychomotor. Within each 
domain certain objectives are cqtegorized and sub-categorized. 
For example, the cognitive domain is categorized into such 
things as knowledge of specifics, knowledge of criteria,. 
application, analysis and evaluation. Some categories.in 
the affective domain are awareness, willingness to ~espond, 
and satisfaction in response. 
There are, however, two main criticisms that can be 
directed towards both Nisbet's and Bloom's approach. The 
first is to do with the list of objectives. While both 
writers agree that there may be some disagreement as to what 
the list of objectives should consist of, their final list 
is more of one achieved by consensus than by rational 
argument. Nisbet, for example, was concerned about high-
level aims such as "to facilitate complete living" and "to 
promote the highest intellectual or moral development of the 
pupil". He was equally concerned about specific practical 
aims such as "to produce Macbeth" and "to make first year 
Latin interesting". He therefore set out to produce a 
comprehensive list of "intermediate practical objectives". 
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But it is not enough simply to specify a list of object-
ives that is hoped will gain acceptance by a majority'of 
people. The objectives must be clearly stated and argued 
for. 
While Nisbet's description of high-level or ultimate 
aims may be vague this does not mean that the aims should be 
dismissed. If there are ultimate aims then these aims 
should be clarified such that clear teaching objectives may 
be developed. To introduce "intermediate practical 
objectives" does not clarify ultimate aims and until these 
ultimate aims are clarified then there is much room for dis-
agreement about the practical objectives. The same 
vagueness that characterises Nisbet's high-level aims' 
contributes to disagreement as to the value of the pr-actical 
objectives. 
The second point of criticism is to do with what is 
said about the various 'subjects. The approach is to draw 
attention to the contingent consequences of each subject. 
The study of science, Nisbet maintains, contributes to 
spiritual development, and arithmetic and mathematics 
contribute to moral development. When noting that in 
arithmetic the answer is right or wrong he says: 
Virtue, in the form of persistence and 
concentration, is rewarded by a correct 
answer : ,vice, in the shape of careless-
. ness or listlessness or laziness, ~s 
punished quite.simply by a wrong answer. 
(ibid., p. 83) 
The point is that, whether one agrees with the contingent 
consequences or not, the subjects are being fustified by 
considerations which have nothing to do with the subjects 
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themselves. If there is good reason for studying mathematics, 
irrespective of any other subject being studied, then there 
must be something about the nature of mathematics that is 
distinct from any other subject and that ~hich makes it 
worthw~ile for the student to study. Considering contingent 
consequences does nothing to aid in the selection of subjects 
for inclusion in a curriculum. If different subjects have 
the same contingent consequences then there is no reason for 
necessarily valuing any one of them above any other. 
We must, therefore, look at the subject itself, to seek 
out what is unique to that subject and to argue for its 
inclusion in the curriculum as con~ributing to the achieve-
ment of clear ultimate aims. 
Forms of Knowledge 
Instead of considering contingent consequences, a 
different approach has been adopted .by P. Hirst in attempting 
to justify a curriculum based on a view of knowledge that 
distinguishes distinct forms of knowledge-_ (see Hirst, 1974). 
Hirst 'originally identified eight forms but in subsequent 
revision has listed seven (see Hirst and Peters, 1970). 
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These forms are logic- and mathematics, the physical sciences, 
the.knowledge of our own and other minds, moral knowledge, 
aesthetic knowledge, religious knowledge, and.philosophical 
knowledge. The. important claim is that these forms are 
distinguishable by four cri ter-ia: 
(a) He first claims that each form involves concepts that 
are peculiar in character to the form. 
(b) In each form the concepts provide a.network of 
relationships g~ving the form a distinctive logical 
structure. 
(c) Each form has expressions that are-"testable against 
experience", the criteria on which the tests are 
based being unique to that form. 
(d) Finally, the forms have a distinctive methodology 
for testing their expressions. 
Thus the truth of propositions in different forms of· 
knowledge is established in quite logiqally distinct ways. 
Hirst's thesis ties in with a view of knowledge as 
reflecting the different ways we experience the world and the 
different ways we use language to communicate ideas, rather 
than a view of knowledge that is meant to reflect the true 
nature of the world. A liberal education is one which 
gives an understanding of the distinct forms of knowledge and, 
therefore, the curriculum should be so designed as to 
introduce students to "the distinct forms. 
Many of Hirst's critics have concentrated on the 
epistemological arguments in his thesis (see, for example, 
Gribble (1970), Phillips (1971), Hindess (1972) and Warnock 
(1977)). Barrow (1976), on the other hand, has rejected 
Hirst's view but developed his own, arguing that there are 
only two distinct forms; namely, the empirical and the 
philosophical. These forms are based on two distinct 
valida~ion procedures. In the empirical form the truth or 
falsehood of propositions is arrived at by a combination of 
logic~and reference to empirical evidence. In the 
philo~ophical form the truth or falsehood of propositions 
can only be determined by logical reasoning. Barrow also 
suggests that there are two basic "interpretive attitudes" 
to the world; the religious and the scientific, and a 
25. 
number of distinct "kinds of awareness". So the truth or 
falsity of every statement, according to Barrow, can be 
determined by reference to one of two validation procedures. 
The two interpretive attitudes represent two distinct 
fundamental conceptions of how the world and existence is to 
be explained. And the kinds of awareness refer to different 
kinds of feeling that can be aroused when contemplating 
yarticular phenomena. There can pe situations where people 
have either a moral, aesthetic, religious or scientific 
awareness, for example. Even someone with a r~ligious 
interpretive attitude may still have a scientific awareness 
provoked by a particular situation. 
The type of epistemological criticism directed at 
Hirst's thesis could also be directed at Barrow's. The 
important point that is implied by such views of knowledge, 
however, is that if someone knows how to set about assessing 
whether a proposition in one of the forms is true, then he 
is familiar with the kind of procedure necessary to 
establish the truth of other propositions in that form. 
He may not be able to give an answer, not having studied the 
required topic, but he knows the kind of procedure required 
to establish an answer. 
The concern of this dissertation is with the implic~ 
ations for curricula and schooling. If we accept that 
certain propositions do, in fa?t, reflect di~ferent ways we 
experience the world, and, in so doing, reflect different 
kinds of knowledge, then we must ask whether this, in 
itself, implies that all children should be initiated into 
the different forms. Is R.F. Dearden (1968) right, for 
example, in taki~g Hirst's thesis and developing "forms of 
understanding" that primary school children ought to be 
introduced to, simply because they can be categorized 
according to Hirst's selection criteria? If not, what 
other arguments can be put forward justifying initiation into 
the forms? 
Finally, we must ask of the importanqeof content. If 
there is only one method o~ assessing the truth within each 
form does that mean that it doesn't really matter what 
content is presented in each form, only that the method of 
assessing truth is acquired? And if the content is 
important, under what criteria is it to be selected~ If 
Hirst's thesis is correct one would have to be able to 
identify concepts as belonging to particular forms before 
deciding on the criteria to be used to test the expressions 
in which the concepts ·appear. 
In drawing attention to a criticis~ of Hirst's work by 
R.K. Elliott (1975), M.A.B. Degenhardt (1982) considers 
these problems under three themes. 
Powers of the mind. One conclusion from Hirst's work 
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might be that in order to develop one's powers of the mind 
one needs to be first initiated into the forms of knowledge. 
This implies that a person would somehow be totally un-
knowledgeable of all things around him; that he would not 
be able to make any operations in the mind after experiencing 
the world through his senses, unless he was initiated into 
the forms. But this underrates the nature of the learner 
whose powers of mind and ability to understand are present 
before any introduction to the forms is initiated. It could 
be argued that the forms of knowledge have, in fact, 
developed from human beings being able to retain what they 
perceive with their senses, and to organize that information 
in some way, in seeking to understand those concepts that 
their minds apprehend. 
Critique of the disciplines. Degenhardt observes that 
mastery of a discipline does not necessarily improve one's 
understanding of the subject matter of that discipline. He 
gives the example of the mathematicized nature of physics, 
where experts in the field have difficulty in relating that 
to physical reality, the assumed subject matter of physics. 
While such doubts can be raised about any discipline Elliott 
concludes: 
These considerations suggest a task which 
properly beiongs to Philosophy of 
Education, namely enquiry into the 
character of the disciplines with a view 
to assessing their educational value. 
It is less than just to give .a student an 
education which encourages him to take 
enthusiastically to a discipline whose 
true character is not what it is proclaimed 
to be. 
(Elliott, 1975, p. 61) 
For example, does one arrive at an awareness and understand-
ing of people's minds by pursuing courses in psychology_) 
that consist of elaborate mathematical relationships 
between arbitrarily defined factors? Elliott argues that 
each form of knowledge, as identified by Hirst, is a 
distinct systematic study but which also is an extension of 
what he calls a corresponding ''common area of everyday 
knowledge 11 • It may be that the understanding of people's 
minds that one wishes to acquire is found in this common 
everyday knowledge. 
What matters most? Under this heading Degenhardt 
considers the question of how the content of the forms might 
be selected. If one selects the content guided only by 
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what best exemplifies the distinctive ,nature of the discipline 
then. the discipline itself could suffer. It does not follow 
that those things that best exemplify the logical features of 
a form of knowledge a:r;e the important things- for. people to 
know about in that form. We still lack criteria for 
selecting worthwhile knowledge. 
Intrinsic Worthwhileness 
Instead of arguing then that certain subjects are worth-
while pursuing because they contribute to the attainment of 
certain specified objectives, or because they represent a 
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distinct form of knowledge some writers have argued that 
some subjects are worth studying because those subjects have 
some intrinsic worthwhileness. 
Before considering some of these ideas a distinction 
must first be made between the intrinsic worthwhileness· of 
engaging in the study of a particular,subject and the 
intrinsic worthwhileness of mastering a subject or attaining 
knowledge in that subject. As an example of the first case, 
we might consider that studying mathematics-and trying to 
come to understand a mathematical concept is worthwhile in 
itself, irrespective of whether one succeeds in that endeavour 
or not. What we are concerned about, however, is the 
intrinsic worthwhileness of attaining knowledge in a-
particular discipline and judging whether success in one 
activity is more worthwhile than success·in any other. 
The question to be asked is, what reasons ,·Lrel:ated to the 
nature of a particular subject, can be given when claiming 
that some subjects are more intrinsically worthwhile than 
others? G.H. Bantock (1963) insists that some subjects are 
intrinsically worthwhile and are more valuable because their 
understanding involves a high-er degree of intellectual 
functioning. He says: 
the fact that ••• some subjects make 
more demands on human beings, require, for 
their mastery, a more complex human 
organization and finally produce more 
valuable consequences is inescapable. 
(Bantock, 1963, p. 94, ~ootnote) 
The point is, however, that while mastering higher ~athematics, 
or appreciating poetry,_may require more complex intellectual 
functioning than playing football, it has to be shown that the 
consequ~nces of doing so are, in fact, valuable. It may be 
th_at_ the complex intellectual functioning that is required 
to engage in· higher mathematics say, is valuable only in 
allowing one to engage in higher mathematics and nothing 
else. The fact that certain subjects may require a more 
complex intellectual functioning does not show that those 
subjects., in themselves, are necessarily wor:thwhile. 
A different approach has been· adopted by R.S. Peters in 
his book Ethics and Education (1966). While he has 
subsequently expressed doubts, about the arguments expressed 
in that book (see, for example, Peters' chapter in Hirst 
(ed.) (1983) pp. 30-61) his views there have evoked much 
discussion. 
In the book Peters a::gues 'that education involves the 
inttiation of ·ethers into worthwhile activities and that the 
activities that are educationally worthwhile are valued for 
their own sake. The first problem he considers is to 
determine what· makes some· activities more wo_rthwhile than 
others. What makes mathematics and history more worthwhile 
, pursuing than football or billiards say? The first step in 
answering that question is to establish that there are in 
fact fundamental differences between activities like 
mathematics and football that do not exist between billiards 
and football or between mathematics and history. Both 
billiards and mathematics may be "disinterested, civilized 
and skilful pursuits", yet mathematics.seems to earn a place 
on the school curriculum ahead of billiards. 
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Firstly, in arguing for a fundamental difference between 
certain activities, consideration could be given to the 
object of the activity. Some activities, like eating, have 
limits imposed upon them due to bodily conditions. Also, 
some activities are competitive. When one person acquires 
money there is less for others. But in theoretical 
activities, Peters argues, the object of pursuit, be it 
truth or creation of beauty, is not under anybody's 
possession and no one is prevented from pursuing truth or 
creating beauty if others are involved in it. There is 
something permanent about the object. of these theoretical 
activities. 
j J.. 
Theoretical activities can also be differentiated from 
other activities in respect of the opportunities they provide 
for skill and discrimination. Card games or football have 
a conventional objective which can be attained in many ways. 
But, says Peters, "truth is not an object that can be 
attained; it is an aegis under which there must always be 
progressive development." So there must be opportunities 
for "fresh discrimination and judgement and for the develop-
ment of further skills". (Peters, 1966, P· 158) 
A third consideration is to do with the cognitive nature 
of the activities. Knowledge can be involved in games and 
pastimes, but this is limited to the end of the activity. 
One can be knowledgeable of the rules of bridge but the 
purpose is to compete and win at the game. Theoretical 
activities, on the other hand, have a wide ranging cognitive 
content. In science and literature there is a hug.e amount 
to know and that knowledge contributes to how one views other 
things. So while they may be like games in being dis-
interested pursuits, sometimes pursued for intrinsic values, 
they are given a value that is not given to mere games or 
pastimes: 
They are "serious" and cannot be 
considered merely as if they were 
particularly delectable pastimes, 
because they consist largely in the 
explanation, assessment, and illumin-
ation of the different facets of life. 
They thus insensibly change a man's 
view of the world. 
(ibid •. , p. 160) 
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The problem now to be considered is why, when answering 
seriously the question "Why do this rath.er than that?", would 
someone choose those activities that are "serious" or 
"theoretical"? Merely establishing that certain activities 
are fundamentally different from others does not explain why 
some of them are more worthy of pursuit. 
Peters claims 'firstly that this question can only be 
seriously asked by people who have some conception of what 
the different choices are and that this" ••• has been formed 
in the main by the differentiated forms of understanding that 
have been developed" (ibid., p. 161). Thus, the very 
activities that have been differentiated as having wide-
ranging cognitive content are the ones that are· necessary to 
answer t!i.e question "Why do th-is rather than that?"-
Secondly, Peters' "serious" activities can be distinguished 
from other activities by their concern with truth. They are 
concerned with truth just as the person who asks the question 
"Why do this rather than that?" is concerned with the truth. 
It is argued that these "serious" activities, as well as being 
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necessary in answering the question 11 Why do this rather than 
that?", are also involved in asking it. 
For Peters, truth and rationality are among th~ 
ultimate human valu€s, and so he is led to a justification 
for "serious" activities based on a view of the nature of 
man as well as the characteristics that determine these 
"serious" activities. 
In assessing Peters' arguments Degenhardt (1982) 
indicates that some people can engage in "serious" activities 
for reasons other than because the activities are deemed to 
be about truth and rationality. They pursue them because 
in some way they find them interesting and important. 
People do not just decide to do something because it is about 
truth and rationality. Instrumental reasons aside, they 
decide to pursue certain activities because somehow those 
activities help them in solving particular problems that they 
consider troublesome but important in their lives. They 
give the person different ways of viewing problems that that 
person feels important to consider. For Degenhardt the 
question is why do people find some problems in life 
important to consider and why are some activities helpful in 
giving people answers to those important problems? 
Yet part of the point of Peters' insist-
ence on the seriousness of serious activ-
ities is that they are not just pleasing 
embellishments added to life, but are 
somehow part of what life is, or ought to 
be, all about. We need, it seems, to 
ref er to more than knowledge and rational-
ity to work out why this should be. 
He says: 
(0egenhardt, 1982, p. 60) 
World Views and the Value of Knowledge 
In the preceding sections we have considered the ways 
that various thinkers have attempted to give some sort of 
worth to knowledge and what implications.their ideas might 
have for the curriculum. In each case we have found that 
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there are serious objections. In this section we present 
the ideas of M.A.B. Degenhardt who, in his book Education 
and the Value of Knowledge argues that we are wrong to 
regard knowledge as being either instrumentally useful or as 
an end in itself. He argues that this overlooks a third 
possibility, a way of valuing some knowledge that is related 
to a distinct view about the nature of man. 
Degenhardt tackles the question of what constitutes a 
worthwhile curriculum by considering three ideas. Firstly, 
he rejects the dichotomy between knowledge as a means to an 
end and knowledge as an end in itself. A third possibility, 
he claims, is that some knowledge is valuable because it 
helps us to determine our ends. Secondly, the view of man 
as a free agent in the world enables him to decide what ends 
he sets himself and these ends are best determined by first 
acquiring a world view; that is, having some understanding 
of the nature of the world and the nature of man in that 
world. Such a view, he claims, should not be generated 
individually but should be socially inherited. So, thirdly, he 
argues for the great evolved bodies of knowledge to be 
central to the content of the curriculum, in that, as they 
have evolved across generations and cultures, they have 
become "more rigorous and self-critical, less parochial, and 
much enriched from the achievements of many thinkei;s" 
(Degenhardt, 1982, p. 89). 
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. In support of his argument for the rejection of the 
dichotomy between knowledge as a means to an end and knowledge 
as an end in i.tself, he lists several ambiguities. Firstly, 
when one talks of knowledge being good in itself, it is not 
clear whether one is talking of the good in possessing the 
knowledge or the good in pursuing it. While pursuing 
knowledge may be worthwhile under some criteria, it should not 
be confused with the value inherent in possessing that 
knowledge. 
Secondly, Degenhardt considers the ambiguity between the 
intrinsic worth attached to an individual person poss·essing 
knowledge and the intrinsic worth of the total knowledge 
possessed by humans existing and growing. 
A third ambiguity concerns the claim that an introduction 
into the various forms of knowledge nurtures those qualities 
of mind that are valued. For example, an introduction into 
mathematics, it might be argued, develops sound deductive 
reasoning. But it is not clear where we can separate the 
qualities of mind from the subject. That is, to be able to 
engage ~n sound deductive reasoning, it might be claimed, is 
to be able to do mathematics and does not- follow from it. 
A fourth ambiguity concerns the different ways in which 
knowledge can be pursued for ends that are distinct from that 
knowledge. For example, a mathematician who engages in 
mathematics in order to solve practical problems involved 
with the construction of bridges may be said to be less 
concerned with mathematical knowledge as such, than someone 
who engages in mathematics in order to arrive at hitherto 
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unknown solutions to mathematical problems. On the other 
hand, the first mathematician may be said to be more concerned 
with mathematical knowledge than someone who studies the 
subject simply to acquire qu~lifications to enhance his job 
promotion prospects. 
Finally, Degenhardt points out that it is absurd to think 
that all knowledge can be thought of as intrinsically good. 
There is much pointless data, the lack of knowledge of which 
would not seriously disadvantag.e anyone. 
Therefore, the claim is that inherent worth cannot be 
attributed to all knowledge or any knowledge, but only to 
bodies of "serious" or "significant" knowledge. This 
seriousness puts knowledge into a third value category: 
It is not valuable as an end in itself, 
for it is serious or significant in so 
far as it makes a difference to how one 
lives. But neither is it useful, for 
it is not knowledge that is to be used 
to some further end. Rather, it is 
the kind of knowledge that helps us to 
determine our ends. By this I mean 
that it gives us that picture or under-
standing of things in terms of which we 
can decide what to do with our lives, 
what aims to set ourselves, what ends to 
live for. 
(ibid. , p. 8 5) 
So.while he·gives value to some knowledge, he is also 
tying~this value to a particular view of the nature of man as 
a free agent. That is, man is able to make decisions for 
himself about how he will conduct his life and what ends he 
will strive for. Such ends are determined after one has 
acquired a world view; an understanding of man, his world, 
-
and the universe. The acquisition of such a world view 
cannot be done individually, but i~ done as ideas are socially 
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inherited through education, both planned and unplanned. 
And how one is to behave in that world, and what ends are to 
be strived for, can only be done in the light of the culture 
that has been passed on. Thus, says Degenhardt: 
Given this, it must surely follow that 
we should educate human beings into 
such a cultural inheritance as will 
best fit them for the distinctively 
human enterprise of working out what 
sorts of human beings they are to make 
of themselves. 
(ibid., p. 88) 
It is, therefore, the traditional bodies of knowledge that 
have educational importance because they help man reflect on 
questions concerning the nature and meaning of life. And as 
they have evolved across generations and cultures with the 
contributions of a great many thinkers, they offer the best 
that can be given in allowing one to develop a world view and 
to determine one's ends. The· arg~ment is then for a 
curriculum that offers the evolved bodies of knowledge, not 
just as technical disciplines designed for instrumental 
usefulness, but as a means to reflect on the achievements of 
other thinkers, and in answering questions about man, his 
world, and the universe. 
One criticism of this argument might be that it is too 
idealistic. To say that human beings ought to be educated 
into a cultural,inheritance that will best enable them to 
work out what they are to do with their lives, is like 
claiming that everyone ought to be free from hunger; people. 
will agree in principle but doubt that it is possible. Some 
people may not be in any position to determine their own 
·ends, irrespective of the knowledge they have acquired, so 
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the curriculum ought to be based on preparing people for the life 
they wil+· lead rather than the life they decide to lead. A 
student might find himself in a position where he has 
determined what he would like to do with his life but is 
unable to follow that course. Ought he not, therefore, be 
in the best position to seek fulfilment in the life that has 
been determined for him? 
In reply, there can be no doubt that many students will 
have aspirations, determined partly by the influence of 
schooling and studying particular subjects, that will not 
achieve fruition. The view that man ought to be educated 
to be in the best position to determine his own ends is 
based on a particular notion of human nature; namely, the 
ability of the human being to act freely on the world and 
where choice is inevitable; but only within the limits 
imposed by society. So the human being who has determined 
his own ends but is unable to follow that path ought to be 
able to see why he is unable to do so by understanding the 
constraints that are imposed upon him. Someone who is in 
the best position to determine his own ends could only be 
said to be in the best position if those ends are possible 
within the limits imposed. 
A second criticism of Degenhardt's position might be 
that the programme is not practical. Given the different 
psychological make-up of students, are there methods of 
instruction that will enable them to understand and reflect 
on the different disciplines in the same way; a way that 
best fits all of them to determine their own ends? And, if 
not, how are we to cater for individual differences? Also, 
does the arg,ument suggest that there are two -distinct ways 
of loo~ing at the disciplines? One can achieve technical 
mastery in a subject, like mathematics say, without any 
understanding of the nature of matheMatics or its cultural 
.significances. But is it clear that one could have such.an 
understanding of the subject without first coming to master 
its technical side? Can one fully appreciate the effect 
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that the calculus has had on society since the 1600s, for 
example, without first understanding the mathematical concepts 
involved in differentiation and integration? 
Clearly, to begin to answer these sorts of-questions, 
one is going to have to look closely at the specific 
disciplines; firstly, from the philosophical perspective, to 
elucidate their nature and foundational concepts; and, 
secondly, from a cultural perspective, to determine the 
influence that the discipline has had on society and the 
forces within society that have influenced the growth of the 
discipline. Only then will one be able to argue for or 
against the practicability of the progra:mrrte for the various 
disciplines. 
The next chapter is concerned then with a critical 
exa:rnination of various theories ·on the '·nature of mathematics. 
and the way forces within society have influenced the 
evolution of mathematical concepts. 
CHAPTER III 
THE NATURE OF MATHEMATICS 
The aim of this chapter is to show the development of a 
theory about mathematical knowledge which breaks with 
traditional thinking about the nature of mathematics. 
Dominant philosophies have nearly all stressed the a pr,iori 
nature of mathematics. Mathematical knowledge is regarded 
as different in kind from scientific knowledge in that it 
can be obtained without the use of the senses. This 
aprioris~ view has been the basis of the traditional schools 
of thought regarding the nature and foundations of 
mathematics. These traditional philosophies have all been 
disputed at times but alternative philosophies have not been 
fully articulated. P. Kitcher (1983) has now developed a 
theory of mathematical knowledge which rejects mathematical 
apriorism. 
To show the development of Kitcher's theory this chapter 
starts with a consideration of the older views of Plato and 
Aristotle and the 19th century views of Leibniz and Kant 
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which anticipated the three dominant a priori philosophies of 
mathematics in the 20th century; namely, formalism, intuition-
ism and logicism. J.S. Mill's 19th century empiricist view 
of mathematics is also considered here. 
The three dominant philosophies are then examined in 
some detail and it is concluded that while they do give some 
insight into the activities of mathematicians, they are not 
adequate in their description of the nature of mathematical 
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knowledge. It is argued that this is because they view 
mathematics as something that is unchanging with time, 
whereas a consideration of historical episodes suggests that 
mathematics is in a process of evolution, and that the 
mathematical knowledge we have today has evolyed in response 
to practical problems within different cultures and with the 
need to generalize and make rigorous the symbolic mathematical 
language that is being used. 
It is shown how Kitcher's comparison of mathematical 
change with theories of scientific change, and his re-
assessment of Mill's earlier empi_ricist view of mathematics, 
provide the basis for a theory of mathematical knowledge that 
accounts for its evolution from basic manipulations in the 
environment to the mathematics that we have today. For 
Kitcher, mathematics is a theory about the possibilities that 
exist in the physical world. 
Finally, the last section of this chapter considers the 
example of the calculus from 1650 to 1900 and illustrates its 
developmen~ in line with Kitcher's .theory of mathematical 
change. 
Earlier Views 
(i) Plato held that it was an intellectual task of man· to 
distinguish appearance from reality. The appearance of the 
world around him, gained through sense experience, was ever 
changing, whereas reality, which could not be apprehended by 
the senses,was unchanging. This view was articulated by 
Plato in what is called his Theory of Forms and originated out 
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of certain general ideas that featured in dialectical disputes. 
In ·any disputation one ultimately must make clear the concepts 
involved. When there is argument over whether, say, honesty 
is a virtue, we are dealing with concepts of honesty and 
·virtuousness which have to be made clear. Similarly, when we 
talk of someone's honesty improving, we are comparing that 
.person's standard of honesty to some ideal standard which is 
regarded as unchangeable through time. Our understanding of 
these ideal standards is not seemingly dependent upon our 
senses. When we observe phenomena we might readily agree 
that if our eyesight was sharper we would see things clearer 
and have a better knowledge of them, but general notions of 
honesty and virtuousness are not seemingly apprehended by the 
senses, and when we attain certainties about them, even if 
only negative ones, we do so by argument. 
Through such considerations, and particularly with his 
mathematical orientation, Plato was led to develop the Theory 
of Forms. Geometrical truths about triangles were not 
thought of as just truths of particular triangles drawn on 
paper or in the sand, but as truths of all possible triangles. 
Geometry and arithmetic were regarded as studies of certain 
realities that do not have the imprecision of things tha~ 
occur in the everyday world. Plato noted that dialectical 
disputes were also concerned with concepts that have only 
imperfect representations in the everyday world. So that to 
argue that honesty is a virtue is to argue about the concepts 
of honesty and virtuousness that do exist, but not -in the 
everyday world. Whereas our everyday world contains examples 
of triangularity, honesty and virtuousness, the Forms of 
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triangularity, honesty and virtuousness exist permanently and 
independently of man, and in a world that is not apprehended 
by the senses. 
Some of the Forms became the domain of mathematicians. 
Oneness, twoness, point, line, circle, for example, are 
mathematical Forms and dots and marks.drawn on paper are only 
approximations to these Forms. Not only that, there are also 
relationships between the Forms, and it is the job of the 
nathematician to discover them, just as others may seek to 
discover relationships between objects in the physical world. 
Instead of relying on his senses, however, the mathematician 
relies on his reason. 
This view of mathematics appeals to some mathematicians, 
as Korner says: 
••• Platonism is a natural 'philosophical 
inclination of mathematicians, in parti9ular 
those who think of themselves as the 
discoverers of new truths rather than of new 
ways of putting old ones or as making 
explicit logical consequences that were 
already implicit! 
(Korner, 1960, p. 15) 
The proposition, that one plus two equals three, states a 
reiationship between the Forms of "oneness", "twoness" and 
"threeness", and is true independent of anything we can s·ense 
in the physical world. By reason the mathematician can 
discover this truth of mathematics. Similarly, the 
proposition, that any two straight lines which are not 
parallel, intersect at one point, states a relationship 
between the Forms of "line" and •!point 11 and no physical 
demonstration is needed to judge the truth of this proposition. 
It is important to note that Plato did not idealize his 
Forns from the physical world and sense experiences. He 
·did· not, for example, idealize the Form "circle" froM t!le 
·~any instances of circularity that he sensed in the physic~l 
worlc. The Form ~·circle" does exist, is permanent and is 
·not apprehended ~by the· sense~-. · All emp~·rical exa!11ples of 
circularity are only approximations 'to this Form. 
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(ii) Unlike Plato, Aristotle's philosophy stemmed from a 
biological orientation where he looked at different life forms· 
and asked what the function of them was. For him, what 
distinguished man from other life forms was man's rationality, 
and what was good for man was exercising his reason in the 
pursµit of knowledge. 
Aristotle rejected Plato's distinction between the world 
of physical objects and the world of ideal Forms. · The 
subject matter of mathematics is not ideal Forms that exist 
independently from objects in the everyday world, rather the 
.subject matter is what can be abstracted from what we perceive 
in the world. For Aristotle, the form or essence of an 
object is as much a part of it as its physical matter. The 
essence of "circularity" does not exist independently from 
circular objects but can only be abstracted by man from 
examples of circular _objects. The distinction between 
mathematical and physical definitions can be distinguished by 
the example of "curve", which specifies no matter, and "snub", 
which specifies the curved matter, a nose. The mathematical 
definition "curve" is abstracted from the physical definition 
"snub". The subject matter of mathematics is then the 
result of such abstractions and these mathematical objects 
are, in some sense, in the things from which they are 
abstracted. 
This notion of abstraction from physical objects avoids 
one criticism of Platonism; namely, if there is an ideal 
Form of threeness say, then what is the status of "three" 
when it occurs twice in the proposition 11 three plus three 
equ~ls six"? For Aristotle this is no problem, as th~ 
abstracted mathematical object "three" can occur as many 
times as required. The work of the mathematician then is 
to idealize the relationships between mathematical objects, 
these objects being abstracted from the physical world. 
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An example of the importance of Aristotle's thought to 
later views on mathematics can be demonstrated by considering 
his ideas on infinity. The notion of infinity has caused 
considerable difficulties in much recent work on the 
foundations of mathematics. 
Aristotle distinguished between two notions of the 
infinite, the actual and the potential. If we consider the 
sequence of natural numbers 1, 2, 3, ••.• and the possibility 
of always obtaining the next member in the sequence and of 
proceeding as far as we want to, then we have the notion of 
the potential infinite. We never obtain a complete sequence 
of all the natural numbers, but we are not stopped from going 
as far as we like. This, however, is in contrast to the 
notion of the actual infinite, where the natural nurr~ers are 
deemed.to be given in totality. Under this notion there 
exists a set, the elements of which are all the natural 
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numbers. Aristotle favoured the use of the potential 
infinite and much of modern mathematics needs only this 
notion of infinity. The use of the notion of actual 
infinity, however, produces many antimonies (paradoxes). 
An example will be considered in the section on logicism, 
later in this chapter. 
(iii) Unlike Plato and Aristotle, Leibniz does not take 
mathematical propositions to be about anything, neither mind-
independent eternal objects nor abstractions from the 
physical world. He maintains that mathematical statements 
are true by virtue of the fact that their denial would be 
impos'Sible. 
He identifies two kinds of truths, those of reasoning 
and those of fact. Truths of reasoning are necessarily 
true by the impossibility of their denial. The denial of 
truths of fact, however, is possible. Their truth is 
contingent. 
Consider two examples. The proposition that, if A is 
\ 
greater than B and B is greater than C, then A is greater 
than C; is a truth of reasoning. It would be impossible 
for A not to be greater than C under these constraints. 
But the proposition that all metals expand on heating, is 
a truth of fact and its denial is possible. It's just that 
no metal is known not to expand on heating. Leibniz thus 
regards the truths of mathematics akin to the truths of logic 
and, in this sense, he foreshadows the modern movement of 
logicisrn, which maintains that all mathematics is reducible 
to logic., 
The relationship between pure and applied mathematics is 
tied up in what for Leibniz is "the best of all possible 
worlds". As a proposition in pure mathematics, "One plus 
one equals two" is true for its denial is impossible. The 
proposition "One apple plus one apple makes two apples" is 
true in this world, for anything else would not be true in 
the best of all possible worlds that could be created. 
(iv) While Kant rejects Leibniz's dichotomy of propositions 
between those of reasoning and those of fact, he is concerned 
about the different ways of knowing. In his book Critique 
of Pure Reason he says: 
It is therefore a question which requires 
close investigation, and is not answered 
at first sight - whether there exists a 
knowledge altogether independent of 
experience, and even of all sensuous 
impressions. Knowledge of this kind is 
called a priori, in contradistinction to 
empirical knowledge, which has its sources 
a posteriori, that is, in experience. 
(Kant; Trans. by Meiklejohn; 1964, p. 25) 
Kant then develops a three way classification of propositions. 
(a) Some propositions he describes as being analytic in 
that their denial is self-contradictory. The truth of these 
propositions can be shown py analysing the terms and concepts 
involved in-the propositions. An example is the proposition 
"All bachelors are unmarried". Nothing, other than the 
meanings of the terms involved in the proposition, is needed 
to judge its truth. These propositions correspond to 
Leibniz's propositions of reasoning. For Leibniz, all pure 
mathematical propositions are of this form. 
(b) Kant then describes sane propositions as being 
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synthetic a posteriori. That is, they do describe a state 
of affairs in the physical world and their truth is judged by 
sense perceptions. An example of this type of proposition 
is "My pen is blue 11 • The denial of this proposition is not 
self-contradictory and the truth of it is judged by using 
the senses. 
(c) Finally, Kant considers some propositions as being 
synthetic a priori. These propositions describe a state of 
affairs in the phy~ical world but they are not deemed true by 
use of the senses, but by reasoning. They are necessary 
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conditions for the possibility of objective experience. That 
is, they are necessary in that if any proposition about the 
physical world is true they too must be true. 
Kant was concerned about synthetic a priori judgements 
because he believed that we make these types of judgements in 
physics and metaphysics as well as in mathematics. The 
propol:?ition "In all changes of the material world the quantity 
of matter remains unchanged" is deemed to be synthetic, in 
telling us something about the phy~ical world, and a priori, 
in that we make this judgement before experiencing every 
change. So too the proposition "All men are free to choose" 
is deemed to be synthetic because it gives us new knowledge 
about all men, and a priori, in that we make the judgement 
before experiencing all men. 
Yet there is still the doubt of how we can make judgements 
about the state of affairs of the physical world without first 
experiencing that world. To solve this problem Kant 
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hypothesized a new relationship between the mind and its 
objects. He did not regard the mind as passively receiving 
information from the objects. He regarded the mind as 
active and doing something with the objects it experiences, 
so that the mind imposes its way of knowing upon the objects. 
Thinking involves not only receiving impressions through the 
senses but also making judgements about what is experienced. 
The mind has the power to make judgements without first 
experiencing the world. 
In describing the propositions of pure mathematics as 
being synthetic a priori, Kant introduces another classific-
ation. He distinguishes between discursive synthetic 
a priori propositions, which give an ordering of notions (for 
·example, causality), and intuitive synthetic a priori 
propositions, which are concerned with the structure of 
perceptions. To this latter group, he claims, belong the 
propositions of pure mathematics. 
Kant's argument can then be summarized as follows. 
Being in space and time is a necessary condition for the 
possibility of perception. The subject matter of pure 
mathematics is the structure of space and time free from 
enpirical material. The propositions of pure mathematic~ 
are structures of perception, synthetic in describing space 
and time, but a priori in describing the unchanging nature of 
space and time and in not requiring any sense experiences -to 
judge their truth. For ~ant the mathematical proposition~ 
"Two plus three equals five" is synthetic and a oriori. The 
logical possibility of alternatives is not denied (and, 
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therefore, the proposition is not analytic), but any other 
alternative would not be a description of perceptual space 
and time. 
But Kant's philosophy of mathematics went further than 
simply describing space and time. He was concerned about 
the possibilities that exist in space and time and the 
distinction between a oriori constructions and postulations. 
The concept of a ten dimensional sphere, for example, can be 
postulated and a geometry of· ten dimensions can be developed 
and shown to be be self-consistent. That is, axioms, and 
propositions can be formulated leading to results which do 
not contain self-contradictions. The a priori construction 
of a ten dimensional sphere, however, is not possible, whereas 
the a priori construction, and not mere postulation, of a 
perfect three dimensional sphere is possible. 
The subject matter of pure mathematics then becomes the 
structure of space and time and the possibilities of 
constructions within it. The subject matter of applied 
mathematics becomes the structure of space and time and the 
actual material filling it. 
(v) In contrast to Kant's a priori nature of mathematics, 
John Stuart Mill argues that all our knowledge is empirical. 
To the question; "Are synthetic a priori j udger.ients possible?" 
he answers in the negative. Firstly, he rejects the abstract 
notion attributed to nuIDbers: 
All numbers must be numbers of something: 
there are no such things as numbers in 
the abstract. Ten must mean ten bodies, 
or ten sounds, or ten beatings of the pulse. 
(Mill, 1973, p. 254) 
And just as numbers reFer to things we experience the basic 
axioms of mathematics are not necessary truths but laws we 
accept, based on our experience: 
That things equal to the same thing are 
equal to one another, and that two 
straight lines whi.ch. have once inter-
sected one another continue to diverge, 
are inductive truths; resting, ••• on 
the fact that they have been perpetually 
perceived to be true, and never once 
found to be false. 
(ibid.' p. 609) 
He thus maintained that the axioms of mathematics were 
inductive generalizations based on a large number of instances. 
In this sense they were the same as scientific hypotheses, the 
difference being one of degree and not kind. The subject 
matter of mathematics is more general than any other science 
and its propositions have been tested for many more times than 
the propositions in other sciences. But, according to Mill, 
we are unjustified in thinking that mathematical propositions 
are, therefore, qualitatively different from the hypotheses of 
other sciences. 
Mill's philosophy of mathematics has been attacked from 
many quarters. Principally, the attacks came at a time when 
the three _so-called tradit~onalist schools of thought on the 
foundations of mathematics flourished in the late 19th century 
and into the 20th_century. These three a priori philosophical 
positions; formalism, intuitionism, and logicism, will be 
examined later in the chapter. In a paper on the foundations 
of arithmetic, first published in 1884, G. Frege maintained 
that Mill did not distinguish between mathematical propositions 
and the use to which they could be put: 
Mill always confuses the applications that 
can be made of an arithmetical proposition, 
which often are physical and do presuppose 
observed facts, with the pure mathematical 
proposition itself. 
(Frege, 1968, p. 13) 
And A.J. Ayer (1975), making use of Kant.•-s dictum that 
though all our knowledge begins with experience, this does 
not mean that it all arises out of experience, claims that 
Mill fails to distinguish between knowing mathematical 
truths and coming to know them: 
We may come to dis cover them through an 
inductive process; but once we have 
apprehended them we see that they are 
necessarily true, that they hold good for 
every conceivable instance. 
(Ayer, 1975, p. 318) 
He argues that we will never find an example to refute 
mathematical axioms because they are true by definition. 
They are analytic statements or tautologies. 
. , Some philosophers have been more sympathetic to Mills 
position, however. w.v. Quine says that perhaps in Mills 
time classical mathematics did lie closer to experience than 
it does now, noting that the infinitistic reaches of set 
theory, which are so remote from our experiences, were not 
explored then (see Quine, in Benacerraf and Putnam (eds.), 
1983, p. 355). In a cautious note Quine says that it is 
the relationship between mathematics and the empirical 
sciences that is important: 
I am concerned to urge the empirical 
character of logic and mathematics no more 
than the unempirical character of theoret-
ical physics; it is rather their kinship 
that I am urging, and a doctrine of 
gradualism. 
(Quine, 1970, p. 100) 
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Mills philosophy is an important consideration then 
because it is the rejection of his empiricist position and 
the acceptance of the a priori nature of mathematics that 
saw the flourishing of the three traditionalist schools of 
thought on the foundations of mathematics. But, in 
addition, when these three philosophical positions were 
found to have serious objections to them, some modern day 
·philosophers sought to re-examine Mills work. (See, for 
example,.H.Lehman(l979) and P. Kitcher (1983)). ·They re-
assessed Mills position by highlighting the difficulties 
of using language to convey meanings, and recently Kitcher 
(1983) has rejected the a priori nature of mathematics and 
developed his own "defensible" empiricist philosophy of 
mathematics. Before considering Kitcher's arguments, 
however, we will first look at the three traditionalist 
theories. 
. . 
Dominant·2oth· century views 
During the first half of this century there were three· 
main schools of thought regarding the nature and foundations 
of mathematics; namely, formalism, intuitionism, and 
logicism. This was not to say that all theorists ascribed 
to one of these theories but, rather, it represented a 
classification of the different ideas of those who worked 
in the area of the philosophy of mathematics. These ideas 
had their origins in the earlier work of Leibniz and ~ant 
and, to a lesser extent, Plato and Aristotle. Formalists 
and intuitionists acknowledged the influence of Kant•s· 
philosophy of mathematics while rejecting that of Leibniz, 
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but formalism and intuitionism subsequently evolved to 
differ in quite important ways. Logicists, on the other 
hand, were influenced by the tradition of Leibniz in 
regarding mathematical propositions as analytic, and 
demonstrating their truth by applying the principles of 
logic. 
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It must be noted that a strict three-way classification 
oversimplifies what is a very complex area of study. Each· 
class has many sub-varieties and different writers in each 
class often disagree with one another. It is possible, 
however, to indicate and critically examine the·main 
features of the three theories. 
Formalism 
Strict formalism is the view that mathematics is the 
formal (that is, rule-governed) manipulation of symbols and 
nothing else. Mathematics then consists of a list of terms, 
a list of operations which are modes of combination for 
forming a new term in the list from a set of given terms in 
the list, certain elementary propositions (axioms) which are 
stated to be true unconditionally, and rules of procedure 
for the derivation of further propositions from the axioms. 
D. Hilbert is regarded as the founder of the formalist 
movement, and developed the view in the course of research 
into the theorems and axioms of Euclidean geometry. The 
formalist system was first used by him in the paper "The 
foundations of mathernatics 11 published in 1928, but he is not 
regarded as a _strict formalist, holding that the finite 
combinatorial part of mathematics is meaningful and true. 
(see Hilbert, in oenacerraf and Putnam (eds.), 1983, p. 183). 
ss. 
For example, he would maintain that the proposition 
11 1 + 2 = 3" is within a formal system but that it does have 
meaning and is true outside that system. Accounts of the 
strict formalist position, which denies that any mathematical 
statement has a truth value, can be found in H. Curry (1951) 
and A. Robinson (1965). 
- Strict formalism rejects the idea that mathematics is· 
about mind-independent eternal objects, and it rejects the 
view that it is about constructions in the_ mind. To the 
strict formalist there is no subject matter to mathematics at 
all, it is simply a series of manipulations of symbols. The 
theorems in mathematics are developed. by applying the axioms 
to the list of terms and the list of operations. In plane 
geometry, for instance, we have the terms 11 point 11 and 
"straight line 11 and the axiom "Through any two points there 
exists exactly one straight line". But we might equally 
have definec;l the terms 11 glm11 and "gam blyp" and the axiom 
11 Through any two glms there exists exactly one gam blyp". 
Irrespective of the mental image engendered, what is meaning-
ful is to apply the given axioms to the given terms in the 
correct way. 
But while it may appear that mathematicians merely 
manipulate symbols according to pre-assigned rules, there are 
objections that do not allow us to accept this as an adequate 
account of the nature of mathematics. 
Firstly, one requirement of any formal system must be 
that the system is consistent. This means that the system 
cannot allow a propositio-n 11 p" and its negation "not p" to be 
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c;lerived within the system, thus asserting both "p" and "not 
p" to be true in the system. But in 1931 K. Godel proved 
that a specific contradiction can always be deduced from any 
proof of the impossibility of the occurrence of contradictions 
in a formal system. (Discussions_of Godel's paper can be 
found in R. Wilder (1965), s. Korner (1960) and M. Black 
-, 19 33) l 
Secondly, for someone who has done any mathematics at 
all, it is_not simply an arbitrary manipulation of symbols. 
When grappling with a mathematical problem one is not simply 
dealing with symbols, but ideas and constructions .in the mind. 
Such constructions may eventually be symbolized but they are 
talked about and discussed in ways which suggest they are more 
than simply symbols used by mathematicians. To the 
mathematician such mental constructions are very real. Two 
distinct proofs of a theorem may use quite different symbols 
while still embodying the same ideas or mental constructions. 
The mathematician can see beyond the symbols and can give 
meaning to the ideas represented by the symbols. 
-A further criticism of formalism is that if mathematics 
is just a game played with symbols, why is it so useful in 
predicting outcomes of events in the physical-world? And why 
do we choose some axioms and not others? If it is sheer 
arbitrariness then there is a difficulty in explaining how 
formulae such as v = u + at do approximate to such a degree 
the empirical result of the velocity of an object with.a 
certain acceleration after a certain time. The usefulness of 
mathematics suggests that something other than an arbitrary 
collection of terms and axioms goes into it. 
Likewise the nature of inference in mathematical systems 
needs to be explained. It seems clear that the signs we 
use, such as -.1 (negation) and = (equality) , have meaning 
outside the formal system of mathematics. We accept the 
inference that if a = b then a + 1 = b + 1, but we would not 
accept the inference that if a= b then a+ 1 = b + 2; 
whereas, presumably, such an axiom could occur in some 
formalised system. It has to be explained why some axioms 
appear to have meaning and are useful while others appear to 
have no meaning at all·. 
Fo~malism is rejected then as an adequate philosophy of 
mathematics in that it offers no explanation as to the 
usefulness of mathematics, and in that it denies the 
existence of mental constructions, which are not formal and 
not symbolic, but do have structure and, to the mathematician, 
are real. 
Intuitionism 
The intuitionist's view of mathematics is that it 
consists solely of .mental (intuitive) constructions. 
Mathematics is thus a production of the human mind. The 
existence of mathematical objects can only be guaranteed if 
they can be determined by thought, and the properties of 
mat~ematical objects are only properties if they can be 
discerned by thought. The symbolic mathematical language 
that is used is simply a device for communicating thoughts 
and allowing oneself, or others, to follow mathematical ideas. 
The fundamental tenets of intuitionism were first formulated 
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by L.E.J. Brouwer, following his inaugural address at the 
University of Amsterdam in 1912 (see Brouwer, 1913). More 
recent introductions to the intuitionist philosophy of 
mathematics are by A. Heyting (1956) and M. Dummett (1977). 
Like the formalist, the intuitionist does not accept 
that mathematics is about mind-independent eternal objects. 
But unlike the formalist, the intuitionist· recognizes the 
{ 
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ability of the person to perform certain constructions in 
the mind. Initially this consists of the construction of 
unity and then the series of natural numbers. All 
mathematics is then buil~ upon these initial constructions. 
A..~d to quote Brouwer: 
••• neither the ordinary language nor any 
symbolic language can have any other role 
than that of serving as a nonmathematical 
auxiliary, to assist the mathematical 
memory, or to enable different individuals 
to build up the same set. 
(Brouwer, in Benacerraf and Putnam (eds), 
1983, p. 81) 
So the only mathematics that is done is done by a series of 
constructions in the mind. The logic engendered by the 
manipulation of symbols is a product of mathematics, and 
with ordinary language it is the _means of communicating ideas 
so that others may effect the same mental constructions. 
The mathematical logic of intuitionism is different from 
~lassical logic. In classical logic the existence of an 
entity can be proved by showing that the assumption of its 
non-existence leads to a contradiction. In intuitionistic 
logic the entity whose existence is to be proved must be 
shown to be constructible. Consider an intuitionistic 
proposition P as the record of a construction: 
P I have effected a construction A in my mind._ 
The intuitionistic negation --,p is also a construction. 
It is not saying that I have not constructed P; rather: 
--rP : I have effected a construction B in my 
mind which deduces a contradiction in 
that the construction A is brought to an 
end. 
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What is important is that they are both constructions and it 
need not be the case that one of them has occurred. Tnus 
the intuitionist does not accept that all propositions can 
be characterized as being true or not true. 
Consider an example. 1f' is the non-recurring decimal 
3.14159--~ •• A We calculate TI in the following way. Expand 
lf until we have a sequence of 100 suceessive zeros. 
Suppose the first run of 100 successive zeros starts in the 
A 
nth digit. If n is odd, let lfterminate in its nth digit. 
A 
If n is even, let 1f have a 1 in the (n + 1) st digit and then 
I\ 
terminate. So if n is odd then Tf is less than lf. If n 
A 
is even then lf is greater than TI· If no successive 100 
;\ If 
zeros ever occurs then lf = rr. Now let Q = lT- rr .. The 
question is whether Q is positive, negative or zero. Now Q 
is a real number, and the law of the excluded middle maintains 
that it must be positive negative or zero. But the 
"' intuitionist does not accept this. 1f and Q have not been 
constructed in the rnind'since it is not known if there is a 
sequence of 100 successive zeros in the expansion of 1r. To 
the intuitionist, the proposition: 
P : Q is positive 
is not true, nor false but meaningless. 
The proponents of intuitionism saw its success in 
removing many of the paradoxes that so plagued the early 
infinite set theorists in mathematics. Bertrand Russell 
defined a set as abnormal if it contained itself as one of 
its elements and normal if it did not. As an example of an 
abnormal set consider "The set of all objects describable in 
exactly eleven English words". Russell then considered the 
set N of all normal sets. Is N ~bnormal or normal? If N 
is normal then it is one of the set of all normal sets and 
hence is an element o~ N. But this means N is abnormal. 
Conversely, if N is abnormal then it is one of its own 
elements, which are all normal sets. Hence N is normal. 
The intuitionist removes the paradox by claiming that 
if he cannot construct in his mind a set that has itself as 
a merrher, then talk of them is meaningless and is not·a part 
of mathematics. The beauty of the intuitionist programm~ 
then is that it does not produce ideas and concepts that the 
mind cannot accept. 
There are criticisms, however, which suggest that 
intuitionism is not an adequate philosophy of mathematics. 
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In describing matnematical activity as intuitive constructions_ 
the intuitionist denies that the inner experience refers to 
any external reality. · But in so doing the mathematician then 
gives up the most powerful motivation for his work - to seek 
truth that can be publicly validated. A mathematician is not 
interested in intuitive Gonstructions for their own sake but· 
for the new truths they enable him to find. As Goodman says: 
Just as the constructions lie behind the 
symbols and give them their interest and 
meaning, so there is something behind . 
the constructions - mathematical truth. 
(Goodman, 1979, p. 545} 
The mathematician is not free to take any arbitrary set of 
rules and apply them to his mental constructions. 
Mathematical rigour is a restriction on that freedom, and 
mathematical truth does not exist in the mind of the 
mathematician. When we evaluate a mathematical argument we 
determine whether the argument works - that is, whether it 
convinces us of the truth of its conclusion. 
One critic of the intuitionist programme is L. 
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Wittgenstein. He seeks to explain the nature of mathematical 
truth through the collective behaviour of the people who use 
the rules, and as originating from simple manipulations of 
objects in the environment. Firstly, he argues that 
understanding mathematics is not just a mental state but an 
ability to do something; namely, an ability to apply what the 
person claims to know. This overt behaviour is necessary 
before claiming understanding in mathematics. Wittgenstein 
says: 
We are trying to get hold of the mental 
process of understanding which seems to 
be hidden behind the coarser and 
therefore more readily visible 
accompaniments [the overt behaviours]. 
But we do not succeed; or rather, it . 
does not get as far as a real attempt. 
For even supposing I had found something 
that happened in all those cases of 
understanding, - why should it be the 
understanding? 
(Wittgenstein, 1978, p. 60} 
Secondly, Wittgenstein argues that the process of 
inference is something that need not happen "in the head". 
Inferring consists in the transition from one assertion to 
another, but: 
Misled by the special use of the verb 
'infer' we readily imagine that inferring 
is a peculiar activity, a process in the 
medium of the understanding, as it were a 
brewing of the vapour out of which the 
deduction arises. But let's look at 
what happens here. - There is a transition 
from one proposition to another via ·other 
propositions, ••• This may go on""""'Ori paper, 
orally, or 'in the head'. - The conclusion 
may however also be drawn in such a way 
that the one proposition is uttered after 
the other, without any such process; ••• 
(Wittgenstein, 1967, p. 5) 
Wittgenstein then goes on to argue that the mental constr-
uctions cannot serve as a foundation for mathematical 
inference because they cannot give us a way of deciding 
whether the inferences are correct or not. When multiply-
ing, for example, different people may have different mental 
constructions but "the correct multiplication is the pattern 
of the way we all work" (ibid., p. 95). And " • • • ' calcula t-
ing right' does not mean calculating with a clear understand-
ing or smoothly; it means calculating like this" (ibid., 
p. 180). So the criteria of what is right or wrong are 
established on the basis of the collective behaviour of those 
who use the rules. So correct inference is simply the way 
we all do in fact infer. "This is use and custom among us, 
or a fact of our natural history" (ibid., p. 20) • 
The problem is, however, that there is never going to be 
perfect agreement on how to infer and if people disagree and 
infer differently there needs to be a way of deciding which 
process of inference is correct. Wittgenstein's answer is 
that the rules of inference we accept are not just arbitrary 
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but are'influenced by empirical conditions. The origins 
of our mathematical practices are found in the simple 
processes of counting objects and comparing sets of objects 
in the environ~ent. These simple processes provide the 
genesis of mathematical truth. 
This then leads to a further objection to intuitionism; 
that it has nothing to say about the growth of mathematics 
and about cultural significances. If mathematics is simply 
constructs of the mind, what is the nature of the higher 
mathematics that has developed today and that did not exist 
100 or 1000 years ago? Accounts of historical episodes in 
mathematics indicate that for certain periods of time 
mathematics develops cumulatively. The theory of the 
calculus today can be seen to have developed from the initial 
work of Newton and Leibniz in the 1600s, even though some of 
the symbolic language that we use today would have been 
unknown to ·them. The language involved with limits, for 
0 .j. 
example, was developed following the problems Newton, Leibniz 
and their followers had dealing with "infinitesimals". This 
symbolic language is regarded as essential for a full under-
standing of the calculus as we know it today. Any philosophy 
~f mathematics should give an account of why this language has 
developed the way it has and is not simply an arbitrary system 
chosen to represent mental constructions. It must also 
explain why this language is regarded as a better system for 
expressing the mental constructions involved in the calculus 
than the one originally used. 
Logicism 
Logicism is the view that mathematics consists of certain 
truths and the arguments that establish those truths, of the 
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formal manipulations of symbols that express those arguments 
and truths, and of nothing else. The logicist denies that 
there is any subject matter to which mathematical truths 
refer. They are simply true by their own internal structure; 
that is, they are analytic. If one had complete knowledge 
of logical propositions then one could deduce through logical 
means all the theorems in mathematics. 
one giant tautology. 
Mathematics becomes 
Logicism has made a great contribution to mathematics, 
as a lot of mathematics as we know it is just logic, and 
logicism has given the impetus to simplify and unify basic 
mathematic'al notions. But rather than simply stating a 
belief that all mathematics is just logic, logicists, like G. 
Frege (1964, 1968), B. Russell (1903, 1919) and R. Carrtap 
(1931), have attempted to demonstrate that a system.of logic 
could, in fact, generate the theorems of mathematics. One 
would start with a list of fundamental logical laws and a 
list of permissible methods to deduce the truth or falsity of 
propositions. The symbolic expressions ~arking the first 
stages of the deduction would only be logical symbols. A 
system of· logical concepts to be employed for the logicist's 
thesis has been given by Carnap (1931) and is summarized in 
the following tables. 
O.:Je 
Concepts from propositional ca_lculus 
Concept Symbols ·Read 
The negation of a 
sentence p ,.....,, p not p 
The disjunction of 
two sentences p v q p or q 
The conjunction of 
two sentences p.q p and q 
Implication p::) q if p then q 
Concepts from functional calculus 
Concept Symbols Read 
Property f belongs 
to object a f (a) f of a 
Property f belongs For every x, 
to· every object (x) f(x) f of x 
f belongs to at 'There is an x 
least one object (gx) f ( x) such that f of 
Concept of identity 
Concept 
a and b are the names 
of the same object 
Symbols 
.a= b 
Carnap then goes on to say: 
I 
It is the logicist· thesis, then, that 
the logical concepts just given suffice 
to define all mathematical concepts, 
that over and above them no specifically 
mathematical concepts are required for 
the construction of mathematics. 
Read 
a is b 
(Carnap, in Benacerraf and Putnam (eds.), 
198'.3, po42) 
x 
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If we accept the logicist's thesis, then some form of 
transition is needed to get from the logical symbolization to 
a more familiar notation such as 1 + 2 = 3, and for the-
logicist, this involves the use of definition. Russell 
uses definition as a notational device where one symbol 
stands for another symbol or combinations of symbols. His 
definition of the number 2, for example, is a case in point. 
Initially the symbol 2m{f) is defined to mean that at least 
two objects fall under the concept f in the following way 
(where "= 11 is read 11 means by definition 11 ) : Df 
2m(f) = Df (3x) (~y>'[..-<x = y). f(x).f(y)J 
This is read: there is an x and there is a y such tha,t x is 
not identical with y, and f belongs to x and f belongs to y. 
Similarly, we can define 3 (f), 4 (f) and so on. 
m m 
The number 
two is then defined: 
which reads: ·at least· two, but not at least three, objects fall 
under f. In like manner all the natural numbers can be 
defined, as well as negative integers, fractions, real and 
complex numbers, and the operations of addition, subtraction, 
multiplication and division, and eventually the concepts in 
higher mathematics such as convergence, limit, differentiai, 
integral and so ·on. 
The next part of the logicist's programme is to show that 
the theorems of mathematics can be derived from logical axioms 
through logical deductions. Thus, every sentence in 
mathematics, involving mathematical symbols, should be 
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translated into a sentence containing logical symbols and 
should be proved in logic. But the logicist's programme 
raises serious objections that suggest that logicism is not 
an adequate philosophy of mathematics. 
Firstly, the logicist claims that he is not discovering 
mathematical structures by proving their existence, but 
constructing them by definition. In discussing real numbers, 
for example, Carnap says of the logicist: 
~ ••• through explicit definitions, he 
produces logical constructions that have, 
by virtue of these definitions, the usual 
properties of the real numbers.<-
(ibid.' p. 44) 
But what is not clear here is the relationship between the 
logical constructions and the "usual properties of the real 
numbers". How do we know the usual properties of the real 
numbers? Russell's definitions are mere notational devices, 
where one symbol stands for a combination of symbols. But 
when giving a definition two things stand out. Firstly, it 
is implied that what is defined is worthy of consider'ation. 
It would be possible to define all sorts of new concepts 
using different combinations of logical symbols, but why do 
we choose the ones we do, and why do we consider them 
important? Secondly, it is hard to envisage a situation 
where one would wish to define something that one did not 
have some prior idea about. The definition of the natural 
numbers is a case in point. The question should be asked as 
to whether it is possible to have no knowledge of what we 
mean by natural numbers, to read and understand the_logicist's 
definition, and then to assert that one did now know what 
natural numbers were. We are still left with the belief that 
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the logicist's definition does refer to something, some 
concept that we can grasp without any knowledge of the 
logicist's programme. Logicism does not explain the nature 
-
of these natural numbers, nor how we can acquire such 
knowledge about them. 
The second objection to logicism concerns the view that 
all the theorems of mathematics can be derived from logical 
axioms through i'ogical deductions. This view holds that 
every sentence in mathematics involving mathematical symbols 
can be translated into a sentence containing logical symbols 
and can be proved in logic. For the elementary theorems of 
arithmetic this is easily shown, but it has also been shown 
that some theorems in mathematics require special axioms 
known as the Axiom of Infinity and the Axiom of Choice. 
The Axiom of Infinity states that to any class of n 
elements there exists a class of n + 1 elements. That means 
we can always add an element to a set that is not already 
contained in it. This then stipulates the existence of 
infinitely many elements, for we never reach the stage of not 
being able to add one more element to the class. The Axiom 
of Choice states that if ol is any collection of sets 
{A,B,C, ••• } and no set in ot, is empty then there exists a set 
z consisting of precisely one element from A, one element 
from B, and so on. This axiom is qui~e plausible if ol is 
finite but since the axiom is stated for any collection of 
sets one must take on faith the possibility of forming such a 
set z if °'- is infinite. Not only may t:>/., be infinite, it 
may be infinite and non-denumerable; that is, it may be 
incapable of being_put in a one-to-one correspondence with 
the natural numbers. 
The point is that some theorems of mathematics use 
these axioms for their proofs. While some phil~sophers 
accept them as principles of logic others do not. c. 
Hempel says: 
All the theorems.- of._ mathematics can 
be deduced from those definitions [of 
concepts of mathematics] by means of 
the principles of logic (including the 
axioms of infinity and choice). 
(Hempel, in Benacerraf and Putnam (eds), 
1983, p.389) 
But in a cautioning note he draws attention to the 
paradoxes that are found when the axioms of infinity and 
choice are included as principles of logic. And s. Korner 
says, in relation to Russell's definition of number: 
He -not only ·-defines- every __ natural 
number n as having a unique successor 
-n + 1, but has to assume as a non-
logical -hypothesis the axiom of 
infinity ••• The programme was to 
reduce mathematics to logic and not to 
logic plus non-logical hypotheses. 
(K5rner, 1960, p.59) 
To avoid the paradoxes, Russell introduced his Axiom 
of Reducibility and his Theory of Types, which did not 
allow elements of sets to be the sets themselves. But the 
final outcome was to base the foundations of mathematics 
not on logic, in the sense, of the rules of correct 
reasoning, but on logic plus axioms which were needed in 
order to justify the.notion of mathematics that we already 
had. In this sense it was a failure and drew Russell to 
despair: 
•••• after some twenty years of very 
arduous toil, I came to the conclusion 
that there was nothing more that I 
could do in the way of making mathematical 
knowledge indubitable. 
(Russell, as quoted in Davis and Hersh, 
1981, p.333) 
Attacking logicism from another angle, Se Korner (1960) 
/Ve 
argues that it is a mistake to attempt to show that mathematics 
is reducible to logic by virtue of its logical character. His 
position is that mathematics and logic have the same structure 
and yet are two separate fields of study. They are two 
separate a priori disciplines. Whereas logic has no subject 
matter, mathematics does, though not in the same sense, say, as 
zoology. For mathematics the subject matter is obtained by 
postulation. One can postulate the existence of Euclidean 
points and lines, for example, and then derive results from the 
nature of these postulated entities. The nature of the 
derivation of these results parallels the nature of derivation 
of results in logic. 
The Evolution of Mathematics 
In the previous sections we looked at some of the ideas 
of those who attempted to answer the question "What is 
mathematics about?" We considered Plato's mind-independent 
Forms, Aristotle's abstractions, Kant's synthetic a priori 
knowledge, and Leibniz' s claim that ma.thematics is not about 
anything at all. For the formalist it is the symbolic 
language and its associated rules that is mathematics, for the 
intuitionist it is the mental constructions, and for the 
logicist mathematics is just one giant tautology. 
Finding serious objections to all these points of view we 
might then wonder whether it is possible to give an answer to 
the question "What is mathematics? 11 If we assume that 
mathematics is something absolute, unchanging with place and 
time, 'then we may believe that eventually we will be able to 
give a precise answer. Bu~ a consideration of historical 
and cultural factors suggests that the nature of mathematics 
is notso absolute. When we take mathematics to be one 
particular element of a culture at a particular time it is 
possible to get a clearer picture of the nature of that 
activity. 
Now the activities of man are not dependent upon being 
characterized under a particular label such as "mathematics". 
It is in the nature of man to engage in particular activities 
and some of them are grouped together and assigned the name 
"mathematics" to distinguish between them and other 
activities within the culture. The activiti'es are. passed on· 
from one generation to another and across cultures, and are 
greatly influenced by other cultural elements such as 
agriculture, warfare, philosophy, physics, astronomy and so 
on. 
The work of the formalists, intuitionists and logicists 
all give some. insight into the activities of mathematicians, 
but instead of trying_ to give a precise answer to the 
question "What is mathematics?" we should be seeking to 
explain how certain activities of man have become grouped 
to~ether, how these activities have been passed on from 
culture to culture and generation to generation, and, in so 
doing, have evolved to what we call the mathematics of today. 
In his.book Proofs and Refutations published post-
humously in 1976, Imre Lakatos sets out a dia~ogue between a 
teacher and a class of students who are discussing the 
Euler-Descartes formula for polyhedra: 
V-E+F";::2-
71. 
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where V is the number of vertices of the polyhedron, 
E is the number of edges, 
F is the number of faces. 
The teacher presents the proof of the formula, whereby the 
polyhedron is stretched out on a planeo The students 
follow up with a series of counter-examples and the proof of 
the formula is corrected and elaborated. The development · 
so presented by_ Lakatos is seen by him to be a model for the 
development of mathematics in general. His argument is 
that the development does not consist of the accumulation of 
undeniable truths but.consists of a series of conjectures 
and attempts made to prove them (by reducing them to other 
conjectures), or by attempts made to produce counter-examples. 
In this book and the paper "Infinite regress and the 
foundations of mathematics" (1962), he draws heavily on K. 
Popper's philosophy of science (see Popper, 1959, 1974). 
He admits to a theory of mathematical fallibility holding 
that mathematics is a science that grows by a process of 
successive criticism and refinements of theories and the 
advancement of new and competing theories: 
The lo~ical theor¥ of mathematics is 
an exciting, sophisticated speculation, 
like any scientific theory. It is an 
empiricist theory and thus can be either 
shown to be false of can remain conjectural 
for ever. 
(Lakatos: 1962, p.178) 
What is now needed is a philosophy of mathematics that is 
made explicit and that seeks to establish what mathematics is 
about and what forces operate to advance new theories. 
In this section we consider mathematics as a cultural 
system and develop the argument of a recent view,- by P. 
Kitcher, that regards it as growing and evolving through a 
series of rational transitions to the present day. Then in 
the next section we look at a particular historical episode; 
the development of mathematical analysis from 1650 to 1900; 
and see how changes occurred in response to the needs of the 
mathematics that was a part of the culture of the time. 
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(i) A consideration of the cultural influences on 
mathematics derives its impetus from a study of mathematical 
history and the relationship between mathematics and other 
elements of the culture. ~. Kline (1962) and (1972) , R. 
Wilder ~1965), (1975) and (1981), and R. Marks (ed) (1964)_ 
for example, all-stress the dependence of mathematics on the 
cultural life of the civilization which nourished it. The 
classical period of Greek culture from 600 B.C. to 300 B.C. 
and the rational quality of its philosophy and its sculptural 
·and architectural ideals, is compared to the. concern of the 
mathematicians of that age to reason abstractly and to 
contemplate the ideal. Practically minded Rome, and its 
concern with administration and-conquest, produced little 
that was truly creative and original (See Kline, 1972, pp. 
11-12). And so the general character of an age is seen to 
be closely related to its mathematical activity. 
mathematics has attained an extraordinary range and 
applicability. 
In our age 
While a study of these historical episodes suggests an 
intimate relationship between mathematics and other cultural 
elements, it is necessary to delve deeper and to try and find 
the forces within cultures that influence the shape of 
mathematics and that cause it to change. Two principal 
factors emerge; the nature of the problems to be solved, 
and the nature of the symbolic language that is being used. 
Much of the algebra that we use today, for example, in 
studying the theorems of mathema~ics, was unknown to the 
early Greek matpematicians. But there was no reason for the 
Greeks to develop any new symbolism for problems that had 
already been handled satisfactorily by geometrical methods. 
External forces were also at play. When mechanical gadgets 
began to appear in Greek, culture, such as siphons, fire 
engines and "an automatic machine for sprinkling holy water 
when a five-drachma coin was inserted" (Kline, 1972, p.62), 
the society no longer looked to mathematics for solutions to 
its problems. As Wilder says: 
One. can justifiably conclude that it was 
tho.se cultural stresses, external to 
mathematics, that came to dominate the 
course' of evolution of the entire Western 
culture, which were chiefly the cause for 
the gradual dying out of Hellenic 
mathematics. And that, as happened 
later during an era of ingenious 
mechanical experimentation in France, 
ideas having great potential 'died on the 
vine' because of a lack of demand for 
them in the cultural environment. To 
put it another way, science had more than 
satisfied the demands created by the 
cultural stresses of the period. 
(Wilder, 1975, p.155). 
To take another example, for most of its history 
mathematics avoided the use of the notion of infinity. Even 
Euclid's basic axiom said "Every line can be extended" rather 
than "Every Line is infinitely long". Similarly he proved 
that "Given any finite set of prime numbers there is another 
prime not in the set" rather than "There are infinitely many 
primes". But the study of wave motion in acoustics and 
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heat theory and the like, led to a consideration of 
trigonometric series, which further led to questions concern-
ing the foundations of ana~ysis that could only be explained 
by considering infinite_collections. What proved to be 
troublesome for mathematics and was avoided for so long could 
not-stand up against the cultural forces of the day. This 
ultimately led the German mathematician G. Cantor to develop 
his theory of the so-called transfinite numbers, and a new 
branch of mathematics took hold as it offered new ways of 
looking at troublesome !undamental problems. Such became 
the importance of the concept of infinity to mathematics that, 
in 1949, H. Weyl was led to call mathematics "the science of 
the infinite" (Weyl, 1949, p.66). 
We might now ask whether some theory can be given that 
provides an explanation as to how mathematical change occurs. 
Wiider (1975) lists eleven forces that are discernible in the 
development of mathematics. These he labels environmental 
stress (physical and cultural), hereditary stress, symboliz-
ation, diffusion, abstraction, generalization, consolidation, 
diversification, cultural lag,' cultural resistance, and 
selection. Problems in the environment, for example, 
suggest new problems in mathematics to be investigated. 
Hereditary stresses describe forces that operate within 
current mathematical practices, like the challenge to solve 
previously unsolved problems, and- the subsequent need for 
the creation of new concepts. New sym}:)ols are sometimes 
needed to describe new concepts and these concepts are 
sometimes diffused from one mathematical field to another in 
order to 'fill a need in the receiving field. Attempts are 
then made to generalize the results and to consolidate 
diverse mathematical systems by encompassing them under one 
system. Cultural lag and cultural resistance then describe 
the forces operating within communities of mathematicians 
that prompts them to continue with previously tried methods 
and current symbol, usage. Selection then comes into play 
when a choice has to be made among many competing ways of 
describing solutions to problems and the concepts and 
symbols involved. Wilder later takes these forces as the 
basis for twenty three laws governing the evolution of 
mathematics (1981). More recently however, P. Kitcher 
(1983) has given a view of the nature of mathematics that 
does not argue for its absoluteness, that accounts for the 
role of the human agent in its formulation, and that explains 
the growth of mathematics through a series of rational 
changes. It is to these views that we now turn. 
(ii) Kitcher rejects the view that mathematical knowledge 
is a priori knowledge and starts with the thesis that 
mathematics is descriptive of the structure of the physical 
world that we perceive through our senses. He begins by 
claiming that children learn the meaning of the terms set, 
number, addition, and the like, by initially eng~ging in the 
activities of collecting, segregating objects and so on. 
Rather than seeing this as a way of acquiring some knowledge 
of abstract objects, he sees the simple arithmetical truths 
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as true in virtue of these operations: 
•••• we might consider arithmetic to be 
true in virtue not of what we can do to 
the world but rather of what the world 
will let us do to it. 
(Kitcher, 1983, p.108} 
But if the only arithmetical truths are those that we 
perform then how do we explain the apparent truth of the 
proposition 1000 + 3000 = 4000 without having physically 
performed some segregation and collection of objects? 
Kitcher's answer is that mathematics is an "idealizing 
theory". The truths of arithmetic are those ideal 
operations performed by an ideal agent. The important 
point is that one arrives at a conception of those ideal 
operations only through actual operations with" actual 
objects. It-is this reaction with the physical world then 
upon which all of mathematics is derived, and in doing the 
mathematics that, we do we are describing a possible state 
of affairs of the world: 
I propose.that the view that 
mathematics describes the structure of 
reality should be articulated as the 
claim that mathematics describes the 
ope~ational activity of an ideal 
subject ••• · 
(ibid. , p .111) 
Such a view gives rise to questions concerning the 
77. 
distinction between mathematics and science. If arithmetic 
is the idealization of manipulations of objects say, and the 
theory of the laws of ideal gases is the idealization of the 
properties of actual gases, why is arithmetic part of 
mathematics and the theory of ideal gases part of physical 
science? The key here is the role of the human agent. 
Arithmetic is the idealization of actions, such as grouping 
and matching, that human beings make. The theory of the 
laws of ideal gases is an idealization of the way gases 
react under certain conditions. Mathematics, as distinct 
from science, is the idealization of the possible outcomes 
that can occur when a human agent engages in the operations 
of collecting, grouping, matching and so on, with the 
physical environment. 
While we have concentrated the discussion on arith-
metic, in an analagous manner, Kitcher derives the basis of 
geometrical knowledge from the observations ~nd manipul-
ations of shapes in the physical world. The idealization 
of such possible manipulations leads to the propositions of 
geometry. 
Previously, in this chapter, it was noted that J.S. 
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Mill attempted to lay the foundations of mathematics in the 
empirical sciences and this brought much criticism from 
philosophers like Frege the logicist. Kitcher, however, 
re-examines Mill's work and, in fact, develops his programme 
around the language of Mill's arithmetic. Primitive 
notions such as one-operation, successor of an operation, 
additions of operations and matchability are used to develop 
the axioms of Mill's arithmetic, and the results we use in 
our familiar idealized arithmetic of the natural numbers. 
In like manner, Kitcher develops the axioms of the real 
numbers and the axioms of geometry. 
To summarize, Kitcher's main argument, backed by his 
developed programme of Mill's arithmet1c, claims that, 
initially, our mathematical knowledge is obtained by 
physically manipulating the world and describing the 
manipulations. It is because of this that he describes 
mathematics as being empirically based. Mathematics is not 
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about mind-independent objects, nor is it about constructions 
in the mind. Mathematics is an idealization. It is about 
the possibilities of ideal manipulations by ideal agents. 
But more is needed to explain the development of 
mathematics. If there is nothing else to the story then why 
didn't the ancient Greeks know the mathematics we know today? 
Presumably we both start with the same crude manipulations. 
There is evidently more to the story and something which 
Kitcher takes up. He takes our current knowledge to be 
explained by the transmission of knowledge from one society 
to its successor and from the society to the individual, and 
as for the manipulation and observation of physical objects, 
he says: 
Since I. claim that the_ knowledge of the 
mathematical tradition is grounded in 
the experiences of those who initiated 
the tradition, what I have offered can 
best be regarded as an attempt to explain 
how the arithmetical knowledge of our 
remote ancestors might have been obtained.-
(ibid., p.119) 
Then, in order to develop a theory that explains how 
mathematics has evolved from these crude beginnings, he 
compares changes in mathematics to theories of change in 
science by examining recent philosophies of science. By 
looking at particular episodes in the history of mathematics, 
he then illustrates his theory of mathematickl change and 
shows how mathematics has evolved through a series of 
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rational transitions. In order to follow his argument 
then, we first look at recent theories of scientific change. 
(iii) A simplified empiricist view of science is that it 
involves a set of observations and a set of theoretical 
- statements inferred from these observations. As science 
develo,ps, the set of observations accumulates and the 
theoretical statements are·modified to account for the new 
observations. The presumption is that without new 
observations science would be static. However, this 
simplified view of science is one that is rejected in 
recent philosophies and is rejected by Kitcher. 
The work of K. Popper and T. Kuhn has served as a 
springboard for a new way of looking at science. Popper's 
first views were published in 1934· in his· book The Logic of 
Scientific Discovery _(E~glish edition 1959). He claims 
that the difficulties of inductive logic, of moving from 
the particular-to the general, are insurmountable. No 
amount of observations can justify one's belief in 
theoretical statements. Popper's rejection of induction 
thus led him to reject the verification of theories. 
Theories of the world are.not discovered in the sense that 
observations of s'ingular events lead to ;them, nor are they 
verified in the sense that once put they can be shown to ~e · 
true by observing singular events. For Popper hypotheses 
can only be "corroborated": 
tnstead of discussing ·t~.e - 'probability' 
of a hypothesis we should try to assess 
what tests, what trials, it has withstood; 
that is, we should try to assess how far 
it has been able to prove its fitness to 
survive by standing up to tests. In 
brief, we should try to assess how far 
it has been 'corroborated'. 
(Popper, 1974, p.251) 
The power of the h~po~heses is assessed by their ability to 
account for previous observations and their ability to stand 
up to tests of rejection. 
Kuhn's work makes a distinction between what he terms 
"normal" science and revolutionary elements in the develop-
ment of science. He-says: 
••• 'normal science' means research. firmly 
based-upon one or more past scientific 
achievements, achievements that some 
particular scientific community 
acknowledges for a time as supplying 
the foundations for its further 
practice. 
(Kuhn, 1962, p.10) 
Revolutionary elements, such as the transition from 
Aristotle's view of cosmology to Copernican cosmology, and 
the transition from Newtonian physics to the theory of 
relativity, occur as anomalies arise within the practice of 
"normal" science. Questions need to be asked in different 
ways and quite often a new language and accepted procedures 
of reasoning are needed to answer-the questions. This 
often involves a new outlook on the nature of science. 
Revolutionary methods gain their approval by the scientific 
community accepting their ability to e~plain hitherto 
unexplained problems. But the introduction of a new 
language and reasoning poses new problems that become part 
of "normal" science. New observations are made and new 
hypotheses are considered. Scientific change is thus 
thought of as ·occurring through additional observations and 
also through internal stresses caused by the.new language 
and reasoning. For Kitcher these same procedures-can 
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account for changes in mathematics. 
An anticipated objection to Kitcher's view is that it 
appears that mathematical theories have a higher rate of 
survival than scientific theories. The reply is that this 
is due to the nature of the different theories. In 
hypothesizing, the scientist is attempting to arrive at the 
correct theory of explanation. The mathematician is:.· offering 
an idealization of what is pos.sible in the physical world. 
Kitcher contends that our basic mathematical knowledge 
is derived perceptually and then grows through our attempts 
to idealize the possibilities of the physical world. So 
mathematics consists of idealized theories of ways in which 
we can operate on the world. This way of idealizing becomes 
what Kitcher calls a "mathematical practice" and consists of 
five components. These comp?nents are identified as: 
L - a language component, 
M - a set of metamathematical views, 
Q - a set of accepted. q.ues tions , 
R - a set of accepted reasonings, 
s 
-
a set of accepted statements. 
He introduces the symbol <L,M,Q,R,S) to stand for an 
arbitrary mathematical practice and says: 
The problem of accounting ·for the growth 
of mathematical knowledge becomes that of 
understanding what makes a transition 
from a practice (L,M,Q,R,S) to an 
immediately succeeding practice 
(L' ,M' ,Q' ,R' ,s'> a rational transition. 
(Kitcher, 1983, p.164) 
Consider now the five components in turn. 
(a) The language component~ There are at least three ways 
in which rational change occurs in the language component of 
a mathematical practice. Firstly, there are simple 
notational changes in symbols, where new symbols are 
introduced to stand for accepted concepts. Secondly, there 
are examples of disputes arising in mathematics due to 
different meanings being attached to the same word or symbol. 
The resolution of such disputes involves ~ change in the 
language so that the different concepts under discussion can 
be referred to by distinct words and symbols. Thir,dly, in 
attempting to think about problems in a different way, one.is 
forced to introduce symbols that appear to have no referents. 
In Cantor's work on number theory and transfinite numbers, 
for e;xample, he introduced the . symbol "ur" to stand for the 
first number immediately following the series 1, 2, 3, ., ••• 
And i = ~l is introduced to stand for the solution to the 
. 
2 1 0 equation x + = . 
(b) The metamathematical views. The metamathematics of a 
practice includes the standards of proof, the scope of 
mathematics and the ~elative value of particular types of 
inquiry. These views of a practice become most evident 
when other transitions suggest a revolution is under way. 
( c) The.accepted questions. The set of accepted questions 
are formulated in the language of the practice and are 
regarded as unanswered and worth answering. They may be 
instrumentally worthwhile answering because their solution 
will aid the solution of other proolems in mathematics and 
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science. Alternatively, they may not appear to have 
immediate instrumental value but do have clear cut answers. 
An example would be the question "Are there only a finite 
number of twin primes? 11 
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(d) The accepted reasonings. The set of accepted 
reasonings is the sequence of statements that the 
mathematicians put fonrard in support of the statements they 
assert. These accepted reasonings are ultimately connected 
to the metamathematical views of the practice. 
( e) The accepted statements. The set of accepted state-
ments is the set of sentences, formulated in the mathematical 
language of the practice, to which all conversant readers 
would asse~t. The types of changes that could occur here 
involve a reformulation of statements in iine .with changes in 
the language. For example, before the division of numbers 
into real and complex, mathematicians would have assented to 
the statement "There is no number whose square is -1." Now 
mathematicians deny that statement. The accepted reformul-
ation is "There is no real number whose square is -1." The 
thing to which the word "number'' refers has changed. 
To summarize Kitcher's view then, a rational change in 
one of the components of a mathematical practice is intimate-
ly tied to the current view of the other components and more 
often than not involves changes in them too. In particular, 
for a certain mathematical practice, a method is proposed 
for answering certain questions. This introduces a new 
language which advances new statements and threatens existing 
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statements. It may also advance new ways of reasoning. 
However, the proposal for change is accepted because of its 
power in answering important questions, and the practice is 
extended to encompass it. While the search for new 
methods of rigorous reasoning begins, involving changes in 
the language, prior metamathematical _views.may be overthrown. 
The resultant product is a mathematical practice which may 
appear completely different from that which initiated the 
process. A rational transition has occurred. 
Before examining a particular case-in the history of 
mathematics, we conclude this section by matching what we 
have said about rational mathematical change to the question 
.of how people have the mathematical knowledge that they do. 
Given the orthodox philosophical position that knowledge is 
warranted tr~e belief, Kitcher's view is that most cases of 
mathematical belief are warranted in virtue of them having 
been explici t~ly taught by a community authority, or by 
virtue of having derived them by types of inference that 
have been explicitly taught. Kitcher then envisages a 
chain of communities beginning with a community whose 
beliefs are perceptually warranted. He thus sees the 
growth of mathematical knowledge as a process by which: 
•••• a scattered set of beliefs about 
manipulations of physical objects, gives 
rise to a succession of multi-faceted 
practices through rational transitions, 
leading ultimately to the mathematics of 
today. 
(ibid., p.226) 
Thus, to judge the individual~s claim to having mathematical 
knowledge is to judge the coimnunity authority's claim that 
the mathematical beliefs it has are warranted. For Kitcher 
they are warranted because they have been derived initially 
from beliefs that are perceptually warranted; that is, 
from physical manipulations of the environment; and via 
transitions that are rational. 
A Case Study: Analysis from 1650 to 1900 
Present day mathematical analysis originated from the 
calculus of the 17th century. The development of calculus 
independently by Newton and Leibniz introduced a new 
language into mathematics, accompanied by new reasonings, 
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new statements and new questions. But their work was 
accepted for it gave answers to questions that mathematicians 
had been asking for years before that. These questions 
involved such things,as finding the tangents to curves, 
computing areas, and finding the maxima and minima of 
functions. The techniques of differentiation and 
integration, developed by Newton and Leibniz, led to 
algorithms for the solution of many of these problems. The 
power to answer questions was great enough for the new / 
language and reasonings to be accepted. What followed can 
be viewed as a series of transitions, a~ the components of 
the mathematical practice of the time changed to encompass 
this new way of successfully dealing with previously 
unsolved problem~. 
Newton introduced the notions of fluent and fluxion. 
A fluent is any quantity which is in the process of 
changing, and the fluxion is its rate.of change. The 
problem becomes one of determining the fluxion given the 
fluent (differentiation) , and determining the fluent given 
the fluxion (integration). 
As an example, imagine a particle moving along the 
3 
curve y = x where y denotes the position of the particle at 
time x. Assume that through a small interval of time, f) , 
the velocity remains constant. In this time y increases to 
y + y e and x increases to x + x e . Then 
This says the 
y + ye = (x + x a) 3 
3 
x +.ye= (x + . e 3 x ) 
y 
, 
:l. 
• 
x 
(x . e 3 3 + x ) - x 
= e 
2• •2f) 2 3x x9 + 3xx + 83 
= 
2. 
= 3x x 
3x 2 = 
as we can omit terms containing 
$ since they are infinitesimally 
small. 
velocity at time x is 3x 2 • But questions remain 
concerning the reasonings behind the method. Why can we 
assume that fluxions remain constant through a small interval 
of time? Why are we allowed to neglect some terms? Either 
B equals zero or it does not. If it does then we cannot 
divide by it, and if it doesn't then the terms 3xx2e 
are not zero and cannot be omitted • 
2 
and(} 
. Leibniz's work developed in a similar way, except that 
he did not adopt a kinematic approach and his symbolism was 
different. But he effectively arrived at the same 
conclusion. If Y = x
3 h ~ 3 2 t en dx = x • From the work of 
Newton and Leibniz the techniques of differentiation and 
integration were developed and many important results were 
found. Leibniz and his followers found that they could 
compute the sums of. infinite series. For example, 
1 1 "fr {. 2 dx = .1 + x 4 
1 
But the power series expansion of i- + x 2 was known to be 
2 4 6 1 - x + x - x + ••••• and integrating this term by term 
gives 
1 1 1 1 1 ~ 2 dx = 1 - + + . . . . . 1 + x 3 5 7 
Therefore, 1T 1 1. 1 1 = - -+ '":" - + . . . . . 4 3 5 7 
The power o.f the new language and reasonings in 
answering certain problems assured their acceptance, even 
though there were some anomalies. For example, Leibniz 
claimed that 
---
1
-- = 1 - x + x2 - x 3 1 + x + ••••• 
Putting x = 1 gives: 
1 2 = 1 - 1 + 1 - 1 + ••••• 
But surely 1 - 1 + 1 - 1 + ••• = ( 1 - 1) + ( 1 - 1) + 
= 0 + 0 + 
= 0 
. ~ . 
or, 1 - 1 + 1 .... 1 + 1 - • • • = 1 - ( 1 - 1) - ( 1 - 1) - ••• 
1 0 - 0 - ••• 
= 1 
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In attempting to explain the anomaly, Euler writing some 
forty years after Leibniz, suggests that the expansion 
1 ! x = 1 - x + x2 - x3 + ••• holds only when x < 1, if x 
is positive. 
The work of Newton and his successors followed a 
different path to Leibniz's. In 1734 Berkeley wrote a 
scathing criticism of Newton's work demanding more rigour 
(see Boyer, 1~59, pp.224-9). He claimed that while the 
methods were successful, no explanation for their success 
had been given. This call was answered by- a large number 
of writings, providing a geometrical interpretation of the 
algebraic techniques employed. It was reasonable for 
Newton's successors to do so, given their metamathematical 
views of the time and the criticisms levelled against their 
work. But Berkeley 1 s· criticisms on the foundations of 
Newton's work had long term consequences. For Leibniz's 
successors on the continent the criticisms took second place 
to the algebraic interpretation of the calculus and its 
power in answering questions. And, as Kitcher puts it: 
Priding_ itself on its rigor and its 
maintenance of a proper geometric·a1 
approach to mathematics, the British 
mathematical community fell further 
and further behind. 
(Kitcher, 1983, p.240) 
In the 1820s Cauchy introduced the algebraic concept 
of a limit to tackle the problems of the calculus. 
When the values successively_· 
attributed to the same variable 
approach indefinitely a fixed value, 
eventually differing from it by as 
little as one could wish, that fixed 
value is called the limit of all 
others. 
(Cauchy, translated by Birkhoff, 1973, 
P• 2) 
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An infinitesimal was then defined to be a variable ,that has 
zero as its limit. The notions of continuous functions, 
derivatives and convergent and divergent series, which had 
been used extensively by Euler and his cont~mporaries, could 
now be given a more rigorous definition in terms of limits. 
The important point is that Cauchy was not concerned about 
rigour for rigour's sake but for the use of convergent 
series in answering questions that were considered important 
in the mathematical practice of the day. Such questions 
centred around the work done on vibrating strings and 
Fourier's work on representing some functions as the sum of 
trigonometric functions. The problem then became one of 
I 
whether any function could be given a trigo,nometric series 
representation. So, rather than proceeding as a response 
to a call for securer foundations to mathematics, as 
Kitcher says: 
•••• I think that examination of this 
episode will underscore my thesis that 
foundational work is not usually 
undertaken by mathematicians because 
of apriorist epistemological ideas, 
but because of mathematical needs. 
(Kitcher, 1983, p.246) 
The power of Cauchy's work in answering important 
I 
questions in the mathematical practice of the time led to a 
flurry of writing. But.the original work itself provided 
inconsistencies both in language and results. Cauchy's 
use of infinit~simals as constants led to prob1ems and his 
solution to the Fourier problem was not complete. Abel, 
for example, in 1826 showed that there existed an infinite 
series of continuous functions that was not everywhere 
continuous. 
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S . 1 s· 2 1 . in x - 2 in x + 3 Sin 3x - ••• 
is not continuous at each value of x = (2m + 1)1T. 
It was left to Weierstrass to introduce a formulation 
of the limit that banished the troublesome talk of 
infini tesirnals ._ . / Cauchy·' s criterion for convergence was 
formulated in Weierstrass's terminology as: 
00 L_ u1 · is convergent i-f and only if 
i = 1 
for all E > O there is an N such 
that, for all r > O, l~:: ui < £. 
The 1860s and 1870s saw a proliferation of theorems in 
analysis by Weierstrass and his students and Weierstrass's 
formulation is now common to all elementary textbooks on 
analysis. 
Cauchy's work also led to Dedekind's analysis of the 
continuity of the real numbers, providing a transition from 
the geometrical interpretation of considering real numbers 
as spread out on a straight line, to a purely algebraic one. 
Dedekind introduced the notion of a "cut", which is a 
separation of the real numbers into two classes A and B such 
that for an x and y, if x belongs to A and y belongs to B 
then x < y. A cut, designated by (A,B) , is uniquely 
determined by a real number. 
This new language allowed the derivation of familiar 
theorems about real numbers as well as some limit existence 
theorems that Callchy had failed to prove, such as the result 
that a monotonically increasing sequence, bounded above, is 
convergent. Furthermore, Dedekind's work itself raised 
questions concerning the existence of sets which were taken 
up by Cantor and others at the end of the 19th century. 
For Kitcher, the transition.-- from one mathematical 
practice to another does not follow from a response to 
epistemological aims, but to the needs of mathematical 
research. The calculus of Newton and Leibniz was warranted 
because it was a procedure that answered important questions 
in the mathematical practice of the time. Successive 
investigations were prompted by the use to which the 
calculus could be put. The new language and accepted 
reasonings satisfied the needs of research while spawning 
new questions and new problems of rigour. Axioms and 
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definitions were accepted because they systematized previous_ly 
accepted problem solutions, and studies in the foundations 
of mathematics were motivated by the pragmatic concerns of 
working mathematicians. 
To conclude then, this case study has illustrated 
Kitcher's theory by noting some of the rational transitions 
that occurred to make the mathematical practice of 1900 
different from the one of 1650. The next chapter considers 
the implications that this theory about the nature and 
evolution of mathematics might have for the school 
curriculum. Common justifications given for teaching 
mathematics need to be re-assessed in light of the views 
developed in Chapter II on the value of knowledge.and the 
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views developed in this chapter on the nature of mathematics. 
The role that mathematics plays in allowing people to 
develop a world view and be in the best position to determine 
their own ends must be articulated. 
CHAPTER IV 
CURRICULUM CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
In Chapter II, M.A.B. Degenhardt's argument, which 
contends that a curriculwn ought to be chosen based on a 
particular notion of the worthwhileness of knowledge, was 
developed. The idea that some knowledge is valuable in 
educating human beings into a cultural inheritance that puts 
them in the best position to work out what to do with their 
lives, involves developing a "world view" by studying the 
traditional evolved bodies of knowledge. 
In Chapter III, the nature of mathematical knowledge in 
particular was considered, and the chapter concluded with P. 
Kitcher's argument that mathematics began as crude manipul-
ations by man and his attempts to describe those manipul-
ations. The a priori nature of mathematics was rejected 
and replaced by Kitcher's "defensible empiricism". 
Mathematics, it was argued, is an idealization, about the 
possibilities of ideal manipulations by ideal agents. A 
mathematical practice consists of a language component, a 
metamathematical view component, and sets of accepted 
questions, reasonings and statements. Such a practice is 
passed on from one community to another but is subject to 
rational transitions. These transitions occur in response 
to the practice's power in answering important questions of 
the day and in the subsequent work in making rigorous other 
components within the practice. 
In this chapter some implications of the conclusions 
reached so far are considered. The important point is 
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that in most schools mathematics forms part of the 
compulsory curriculum for a great deal of time, and we 
first need to look at the justifications given for teaching 
so much mathematics to so many students. The justific-
ations first considered, and rejected, are the claims that 
so much mathematics ought to be taught to all students 
based on i-ts usefulness, ;i. ts intrinsic worthwhileness, and 
its power in developing the mind. It is then argued that 
mathematics, by its very nature and its cultural 
significances, can contribute to human beings ·developing a 
world view, and thereby put them in a better position to 
determine their own ends. Finally, some implications that 
such a justification for teaching mathematics might have on 
the school curriculum are considered. 
Common Justifications Given for Teaching Mathematics 
(i) One justification given for teaching mathematics is 
that mathematics is useful. In order to examine this 
argument it is necessary to look at the various ways in 
which mathematics might be claimed to be useful. 
(a) It might be claimed, for instance, that studying 
algebra in grade 9 is useful because it will be used in 
studying calculus in grade 11. Of course the objection is 
that no justification is given for studying calculus in 
grade 11. Ultimately, the justification, in terms of 
usefulness, must lie outside the subject. 
(b) A second claim might be that mathematics ought 
to be studied because it is useful in other subjects. 
Technical subjects apply the rules of measurement and ratio, 
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for example. The graphical representation of data and the 
·determination of statistics, such as mean, median and mode, 
are useful in the social sciences.· And calculus is used 
in calculating rates of change in physics. In Chapter III 
we saw that a mathematical practice evolved from crude 
manipulations of objects and as a response to questions 
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that were thought to be important in some way. The view 
that mathematics is the language describing the possibilities. 
of time and space and the view that science is about forming 
and testing hypotheses about the nature of time and space 
clearly implies that mathematics is useful to scientists. 
Two questions remain however. Firstly, can we 
establish that science,.or any other subject where 
mathematics is useful, is itself worthwhile? Secondly, is 
mathematics necessary for acquiring knowledge in that 
subject? If it can be shown that the subject is worthwhile, 
but that mathematics is not necessary for acquiring 
knowledge-in that subject, then there is no justification 
here for making mathematics compulsory. The claim that 
mathematics ought to be studied on the grounds that it is 
useful in other subjects simply forces us to look at the 
value of those other subjects, and the necessity of 
mathematics in acquiring knowledge in those subjects. It 
is not in itself, however, a justification for teaching so 
much mathematics to all students. 
{c) A third claim might be that mathematics is useful 
for people in their employment. It is true that many jobs 
require a lot of mathematics and perhaps all jobs require 
some mathematic$. Highly skilled careers in technology 
quite obviously use a lot of mathematics, since technology 
has developed from man's manipulation of the environment, 
and the language component of a mathematical practice 
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describes those manipulations. But while some mathematical 
knowledge may be necessary for some jobs, the compulsion in 
studying mathematics would demand that the mathematics 
taught is necessary for all students in whatever job they 
secured. -It is not difficu-lt to think of many positions 
where very little mathematics is used. So, in attempting 
to justify mathematics for all on the grounds that it will 
be used by all in future occupations, we have arrived at a 
minimal amount of knowledge that warrants very little time 
at all on the curriculum, certainly not the current amount 
of time spent in most schools. 
Another objection: to be considered is that if the 
mathematics required for certain jobs is quite specific, and 
if it is valued only for its usefulness in those jobs, then 
while it ought to be a part of job training it need not 
occur at school. In fact it can be argued that such 
mathematical knowledge is better taught 11 on the job" and by 
practitioners in the field, where the user can see 
immediately the use to which the mathematical knowledge can 
be put. For any given class of mathematics students at 
school, there is a large range of occupations that those 
students might end up in. It is impractical to present to 
all students all the specific mathematics that they might 
use in such a large occupational range. 
(d) A fourth claim of usefulness might be that 
mathematics is useful for everyday living. That is to say, 
that in the daily activities that one concerns oneself with, 
there is some mathematics to be used. And this is clearly 
so. The simple manipulation of objects and the communic-
ation of ideas requires us to use the language that has 
evolved to describe those operations. This includes the 
basic operations of counting, adding, subtracting, multi-
plying and dividing, and the ability to read and understand· 
the presentation of information from tables and graphs. 
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Such mathematical knowledge is worthwhile on the grounds that 
without it one would not be in the best position to 
participate in the community as we know it. The ability to 
handle simple financial transactions, for example, would be 
regarded as essential for all members of the community, and 
the ability to understand economic issues on a wider scale 
when· deciding how to vote at elections would be regarded as 
highly desirable. It.--seems ~easonable to expect that schools 
ought to be about the.business of compulsorily introducing 
students to this language. But the question is whether this 
requires the current amount of time spent on mathematics. 
Such mathematical knowledge that is useful for everyday 
living is acquired by most people well before the end of 
compulsory education. 
So while accepting that some mathematics is useful to 
all ·people and that some people use a lot of mathematics, we 
reject the claim that the justification for teaching 
mathematics for the current length of time to all students is 
based on the usefulness of mathematics. 
(ii) A second justification given for teaching mathematics 
to a'll is that it is intrinsically worthwhile; that 
mathematical knowledge is valuable for its own sake. 
If intrinsic worthwhileness is simply a matter of 
individual psychology, whereby the learner claims to like 
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doing mathematics and that's all, then there can be no claim 
here for/teaching mathematics to-everyone. Someone-who 
does not like doing mathematics can equally claim that 'it is 
not intrinsically worthwhile and that there is no justific-
ation in studying ite The justification for teaching 
mathematics to all, based on its intrinsiCTlworthwhileness, 
must centre on the natu_re of mathematics and what-:-- makes it 
an intrinsic worthwhile activity irrespective of any 
preference of the learner. 
But then is it the knowledge of the accepted mathemat-
ical statements of the practice couched in the practice's 
language that is valued? For instance, is simply knowing 
that 11 4 + 2 = 6" or that 
"Jx ln x dx = x2 2 (ln x - ~) + c 
for some constant c" 
intrinsically worthwhile? Quite clearly many mathematical 
statements would not be valuable without an understanding of 
the ~easoning behind the statements and_ an ability to arrive 
at the mathematical statements by using the practice's 
reasonings. But the question remains as to why this is 
intrinsically worthwhile and justifies the teaching of 
mathematics to all. 
In Chapter II, arguments for basing the school 
curriculum on the intrinsic worthwhileness of some subjects 
were considered. G.H. Bantock (1963) argued that some 
subjects are more valuable than others because their -
understanding involves a higher degree of intellectual 
functioning. R.S. Peters (1966 and (ed.) 1973) argued 
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that some subjects are intrinsically worthwhile because they 
are concerned with truth and rationality. But these 
positions were found to have serious objections as .they 
stande If we claim that mathematics ought to be on the 
school curriculum for all students then we must present an 
arg?ment based on the educational value of mathematics. 
Some activities may be intrinsically worthwhile but form no 
part of the school curriculum, while other activities, such 
as writing and using calculators, may be deemed to be highly 
worthwhile educationally while possessing little or no 
intrinsic worthwhileness. So the claim that pursuing and 
possessing mathematical knowledge are intrinsically worth-
while activities is rejected as a justification for teaching 
mathematics to all. 
(iii) A third justification given for teaching mathematics 
to all is that it develops the mind or promotes intellectual 
development. The value of mathematical knowledge lies 
outside of the usefulness to which the knowledge can be put 
and the intrinsic worthwhileness of simply possessing or 
pursuing the knowledge. If P. Hirst's thesis is correct, 
and there are distinct forms of knowledge, then it may be 
argued that there are distinct kinds of developed minds. A 
mind can be highly developed in the sphere of moral knowledge, 
for example, but quite undeveloped in the field of the 
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physical sciences. If there are logically distinct forms 
of knowledge, and if a developed mind is defined to be a 
mind developed in any one or more of those distinct forms, 
then it is not necessary for all students to study 
mathematics to develop their minds. To justify mathematics 
learning for all, on the grounds that it does develop the 
mind, implies that one values a developed mind and that 
mathematical learning is necessary for the mind to develop. 
It is appropriate, therefore, to consider the arguments which 
contend that mathematics is necessary for the mind to 
develop. 
(a) It may be argued, for instance, that the more 
mathematical sentences in the mathematical practice that are 
accumulated in the mind, the more developed the mind is. 
But it is difficult to see how we can place value on a mind 
which simply possesses these statements and allows one to 
write them out on demand, as it were. We would hold, at 
least, that one should arrive at the sentences through 
accepted reasonings and see how they are used to solve the 
accepted questions of the mathematical practice. But even 
so, we would still be left with the problem of explaining 
why we value such a mind with ~his abilityo 
(b) If we argue that mathematics is needed to develop 
the mind in general, then we are saying that mathematical 
knowledge is somehow needed in order that development 
proceeds in other areas. This sort of argument would 
contend that while there may be distinct forms of knowledge 
that can be developed in the mind independently, mathematics 
is granted a highe~ status, in that all other forms are 
dependent upon it. Arguments granting this higher status 
.to mathematics might centre around the logical processes 
involved in mathematics. But as we saw in Chapter III, a 
mathematical practice is not just logic, even though its 
reasonings may well apply logical principles. Mathematics 
is an idealization of the possibilities existing within 
time and space and it attempts to form generalizations by 
describing these possibilities in the language of the 
practice. It is this very generalization, however, that 
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makes it appear that mathematics is required for all spheres 
' ' 
of intellectual development. But the sorts of reasonings 
that are required in other areas of intellectual development 
can be acquired within that subject and with no prior 
knowledge of the mathematical practice of the day. 
(c) Instead of arg~ing that mathematical knowledge is 
necessary for developing the mind, we might simply argue 
that it is helpful in other areas of intellectual develop-
ment. This is to suggest that development in mathematics 
might somehow be transferred to other areas of development. 
The attractiveness of this argument s~ems from a view of 
mathematics as being about problem solving in the abstract, 
where training in mathematics is regarded as acquiring 
problem solving·techniques which can be transferred to· other 
disciplines. There are, however, objections to this 
argument •. 
Firstly mathematics is about something. It is not 
problem solving in the abstract. It is about the possibil-
ities that exist in time and space and it is about learning 
a particular language of mathematics that describes those 
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possibilities. Secondly, there is no conclusive 
psychological evidence for the transfer of learning. (See, 
for example, the earlier paper by R.M. Gagne in H.F. 
Clarizio et al. (eds.), 1981, pp.117-126, and papers by J. 
Baron, J.R. Hayes and D. Meichenbaum in S.F. Chipman et al. 
(eds.), 1985, pp.365-426.) It has been easy to show that 
so~e people solve problems more easily than do others, but· 
it has not been easy to show the transference of problem 
solving. Deliberate attempts "to teach students to think" 
have not been successful. Certainly there is no clear 
evidence that mathematics training is necessary for develop-
ment in other intellectual areas. 
Thirdly, even if it is true that there is some transfer 
between different disciplines,· the task should be to 
establish what sort of a developed mind one hopes to promote, 
and then to teach specifically for it. If mathematics is 
to be valued for its role in intellectual development then 
the sorts of reasons given could range from the view that 
mathematical knowledge is necessary for any kind of develop-
ment to proceed, to the view that a mind developed in 
mathematics alone is sufficient to claim intellectual develop-
ment. The psychological evidence, and P. Hirst's thesis on 
forms of knowledge, suggests that mathematical knowledge is 
not necessary for development in other areas ·and we have not 
yet established in what sense having mathematical knowledge 
contributes to the promotion of a developed mind. 
So the claim that mathematics develops the mind or 
promotes intellectual development is also rejected as a 
justification for teaching mathematics to all. In the next 
section we focus on arguments based on the cultural 
significances of mathematics. It is shown that these 
arguments are warranted given the views developed so far on 
the value of knowledge and the nature of mathematical 
practices. 
The Cultural Importance of Mathematics 
So far in this chapter we have attempted to give some 
justification for teaching a lot of mathematics to all 
students and considered arguments in light of our views on 
the nature of mathematics. Mathematics is an e:vorv:tng body 
of knowledge which, at any particular time, constitutes a 
mathematical practice, consisting of a set of accepted 
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statements in a mathematical language. These statements are 
arrived at by certain accepted reasonings. A mathematical 
practice also has important questions that may be unanswered 
and certain metamathematical views that illustrate the s~ope 
of mathematics and the nature of particular types of 
mathematical inquiry. So far our claims for justification 
have centred on only thre'e of the components of a mathematical 
practice. We have considered the use to which statements can 
be put, thee intrinsic worth of possessing statements in the 
language of the practice, and the value that the statements, 
the langu~ge and the reasonings of the practice have in 
developing the mind. Such justifications were found wanting. 
The fourth kind of justification that is argued for here 
considers all five components of a mathematical practice, and 
shows how mathematics teaching can be justified from the point 
of view of the cultural importance of mathematics. 
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In order to do that, it is necessary, firstly, to 
clarify what is meant by the term - "culture". The word 
has been used in many different contexts, sometimes 
synonomous with the word. "society" as in "Australian 
culture", or sometimes meaning one refined in tastes and 
manners as in "a c'ultured gentleman". The word is used 
here to mean that, at any particular time, a given society 
possess~s a __ '~q~~ture .. which is a collection of customs 
rituals and beliefs, and different languages; spoken, 
written and symbolized in different ways; that allow 
communication of ideas between members of the society. It 
is argued that mathematics has been culturally important in 
that it has contributed to the way individuals have inter-· 
preted the world by influencing their beliefs, their problem 
solving techniques and the language they have used to 
communicate ideas. 
' 
,(i) Firstly, we could argue that mathematics is itself one 
of many great cultural achievements and not to be aware of 
these achievements is not to have an understanding of the 
culture. But this in itself is not enough for it doesn't 
take into-account our view of the nature of mathematics. 
The formalist, and his view-that mathematics is simply the 
formal manipulation of symbols; the intuitionist, an~ his 
view that mathematics is the manipulation of symbols together 
with mental constructions; and the logicist, who regarQ.s 
mathematics as one giant tautology; all could look at the 
mathematics we have today and claim it as a great cultural 
achievement. We have argued, though, for the evolution of 
mathematics through rational transitions and the development 
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of a language and accepted reasonings that answered important 
questions within the culture. The mathematical practice 
also had with it metamathematical views on the scope of 
mathematics. To regard mathematics simply as an impressive 
cultural achievement in its own right is not to understand 
how mathematics has influenced the evolution of other aspects 
of the culture, and how the problems. considered important 
within a culture have influenced the evolution of mathematics. 
-~dvances made in mathematics are importantly linked to 
advances made in other parts of the culture. 
(ii) So the second point to be made is that to fully under-
stand how ~ culture evolved one must be able to understand 
how the evolution of mathematics has been a part of that wider 
cultural evolution. To justify the place of mathematics on 
the curriculum by this argument would have radical 
consequences for the content of mathematics courses. Rather 
than simply presenting a language of mathematics and a set of 
statements, one would have to present, from an historical 
perspective, an account of how individuals have influenced 
aspects of the culture by their work in mathematics. For 
example, the study of projective geometry by Pascal and 
Desar9ues in the early 1600s was influenced by painters' 
attempts to construct an optical system of perspective. 
Navigators then used this projective geometry to design new 
map projections. And the writings of Descartes, Galileo and 
Newton in a precise logical style, free from metaphor and 
symbolism, influenced the prose style of many literary 
scholars in the late 1600s and early 1700s. To come to 
understand mathematics in this way is quite different from 
"doing" the mathematics of the present day, which means using 
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the language and reasonings of the current practice to answer 
previously solved problems and arrive at al-ready known 
statements. It is one thing to be able to "do" problems in 
dynamics and another to be able to understand how the work of 
Newton and Leibniz contributed greatly to our understanding 
of the motion of moving objects. 
(iii) The third point to be made is in relation to the meta-
mathematical views associated with a mathematical practice, 
and the power and scope of mathematics as perceived within the 
culture. At particular times in history, man has looked to 
the current mathematical practice and seen within it a mode of 
thinking that he has applied to other elements, of the culture. 
The success of mathematics in answering important questions in 
the physical sciences, for instance, not only affected the 
mathematical practice of the day, it also influenced man's 
thinking in other areas such as the social sciences and art. 
The economists of the 18th century, for example, sought to 
"mathematize" economic theory. Thomas Malthus and David 
Ricardo attempted to identify the factors that influenced 
economic life and to discover natural laws of economy. When 
' this failed, economists concentrated on specific phenomena. 
where they applied their mathematical techniques to deduce 
conclusions. The modern movement now has seen a massive 
amount of symbolism used to describe and predict economic 
behaviour. But in attempting to provide natural laws of 
economy it can only be said that, so far, mathematics has 
failed. The activities of man and the factors that influence 
his behaviour have not been neatly packaged and predicted with 
certainty. But this very fact has also influenced 
mathematical activity. The idea of nature being unpredict-
able and composed of chance events has seen a rise in the 
mathematical theories of probability and statistics. 
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The important point is that the mathematical practice 
of the day becomes' culturally important partly in light of 
the metamathematical view associated with it. While its 
scope may prove to be limited, and while it may not be 
successful in its application to all other elements of the 
cµlture, the fact that man has looked to the mathematical 
mode of thinking as an answer to various problems, is in 
itself significant. An understanding of the culture would 
not be complete unless one had an understanding of the 
various ways man has attempted to answer problems ·within the 
culture. 
The aim of this chapter was to cqnsider the nature of 
mathematics and to argue for its inclusion in the curriculum 
because of its contribution in allowing human beings to 
develop a world view and determine their own ends. It has 
not been argued that there is a "mathematical view" of the 
world but, rather, a view that takes in the achievements of 
mathematics together with other human endeavours.· If we 
want students to develop a world view and be in the best 
possible position to decide what to do with their lives, then 
students ought to be introduced to the combined achievements 
of these endeavours. If one is to have a world view then it 
would be deficient if it lacked knowledge of how mathematics 
has influenced culture. But it would also be deficient if 
it saw mathematics as an isolated element of the culture that 
develops in its own right without the influence of other 
cultural forces. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The conclusions reached can be summarized as follows: 
109. 
1. While the mathematical philosophies of formalism, 
intuitionism and logicism all give some insight into the 
activities of mathematicians, the nature of mathematics 
is that it consists of idealized theories of ways we can 
operate on the world and, at any particular time, 
constitutes a mathematical practice with the following 
five components: 
(a) a language component, 
(b) a set of metamathematical views, 
( c) a set of accepted questions, 
( d) a set of accepted reasonings, 
( e) a set of accepted statements. 
2. Mathematics has evolved from a set of beliefs about 
simple manipulations of physical objects, and through a 
series of rational transitions, to the mathematical 
practice of today. 
3. There is a language and a set of accepted reasonings in 
today's mathematical practice, that is useful to 
everyone and that all students ought to be initiated into. 
This includes basic numeracy, operations with numbers and 
fractions, and the ability to read and interpret the 
presentation of-data in tables, graphs and simple 
formulae. 
4. All students should come to see mathematics not as a 
fixed body of knowledge 'to be discovered, but one that 
has evolved and continues to evolve as man attempts to 
understand the nature of his environment. 
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5. All students should be initiated into the influence that 
mathematics has had on our culture: firstly, by the 
contribution it has already made to the solution of 
problems posed within the culture; and secondly, by the 
way man has sought to use it in 'other endeavours. 
DISCUSSION 
The implications that these conclusions might have for 
the mathematics curriculum will be considered by looking at 
the case of the .calculus, whose evolution to analysis from 
Newton's and Leibniz'$ initial work was shown in Chapter III. 
There is. a lar9e proportion of students who do not reach the 
stage of studying the calculus in their school years, and a 
significant proportion who proceed well beyond it, but in 
most countries students in the advanced levels are presented 
with an introduction to the calculus in their final years of 
schooling. The arguments considered below, however, could 
~e modified and 'applied to other topics within mathematics 
syllabuses. 
We saw that Newton's and Leibniz's work was motivated by 
practical problems and was accepted_ into the mathematical 
practice of the day because it was successful in answering 
important questions within the practice. The call for 
rigorous reasoning then led to Cauchy's work on limits, and 
Weierstrass's work on the terminology led to a new language 
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within the practice. Dedekind followed by an analysis 0£ 
the real numbers in algebraic form and Cantor was led to 
investigate problems associated with sets. But in teaching 
the calculus these topics are frequently presented in the 
reverse order. Real numbers are studied early in the course, 
some def.ini tions of concepts are given, and theorems follow 
concerning limits. A definition of the derivative is given 
and some rules for finding derivatives are proved. Finally, 
some questions are posed with the view Of demonstrating the 
power of the technique in solving practical problems. 
In general, the presentation of the material within any 
topic is designed with a view of passing on the .mathematical 
language component of the mathematical practice. Students 
are graded into levels on their ability to use this 
mathematical language and they pass on to the next set of 
work by showing an understanding of the langaage and an 
ability to use the associated reasonings within the practice. 
It is not intended that students "rediscover" mathematics as 
it were, by confronting them with the problems that Newton and 
Leibniz were confronted with, and for them to derive success-
fully the new mathematical practice. Once the rigour of the 
language has been arrived at the material. is presented in the 
most expedient way. From no experience at all of the 
calculus students acquire, within weeks, a language that took 
decades to evolve after Newton's and Leibniz's initial work. 
What is missing, however, is a study of the forces behind the 
transition to a new mathematical practice. 
At this point we can consider a possiole criticism. It 
·might be said that it is not practicable to design a 
curriculum in order that all students come to see the 
cultural significances of mathematics. Many teachers might 
argue that it is difficult enough to get some students to 
undersband the language and reasonings of the current 
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mathematical practice and to apply them to simple problems, 
without even beginning to think about explaining the develop-
ment of the language and reasonings, the practical problems 
that influenced their development_ and the effect they have. 
had on other aspects of the culture. 
In reply it is agreed that some students will be able to 
grasp cultural significances easier than others. Just as 
students differ in their abilities in the present subjects so 
they will in any future courses. But the fact that students 
do differ in their ability to understand concepts within the 
current mathematical practice does not render impracticable 
any programme designed to explain the cultural significances 
of mathematics. What is required is a programme that takes 
into account these individual differences. · What has to be 
decided is the question of when to present an account of the 
significance of mathematical knowledge and how to incorporate 
it into the curriculum • Should it be part of each 
. 
mathematics lesson? Should it be combined with a study of 
the value of other disciplines such as science or history? 
Other factors to be considered concern the preparation of 
teachers and how a study of the cultural significances of 
mathematics is to be incorporated into their training. But 
while such concerns indicate' that much thought is needed to 
develop a system whereby the cultural significances of 
mathematics form an integral part of the mathematics 
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curricqlum,- they do not, in themselves, show that the 
programine is impracticable. 
Now if we are to argue for a curriculum that should be 
presented to all students then we must ask to what extent the 
current mathematics courses suffice. The higher level 
syllabuses are a preparation ground for a community of 
scholars to engage in pursuing significant questions in the 
practice, but lower levels become "watered down" versions of 
this type, by selecting a language component that is 
presumably easier to understand (though not for all students) , 
and with a view to showing the applicability of the language 
to "real life" situations, which more often than not never 
occur to students after they leave school. From a recent 
publication: 
Most teachers are,aware that-when thesj 
subjects [mathematics and the sciences 
are presented as theoretical and abstract 
studies many students are put off, and 
only those students with a special 
inclination towards the subjects bother 
to pursue them. This cannot be allowed 
to continue, given the role that the 
subjects play in the world. All students 
should continue studies in mathematics and 
science as long as possible. The range 
of mathematical and scientific studies -
should be extended to cover their 
applications in daily life and the work-
place, and to cover also· a wider range of 
student abilities. 
(Education Department of Tasmania: 1986, p.12) 
But as we have argued, the amount of mathematics that can be 
seen to be useful to all students in daily life involves no 
more than basic numeracy and the ability to read and ~nterpret 
presentations of data. Instead of "watered down" versions of 
higher level syllabuses, all students should be presented with 
a study of the cultural forces behind the development of 
mathematics and its relationship to other areas of human 
endeavour. For those with the interest and ability to 
pursue a study of the language and reasonings of the 
mathematical practice, then the current syllabuses exist 
with the specialist teachers in the field. Advances in 
mathematics occur as a response to cultural forces and much 
new mathematics is supplied by scholars in many other fields, 
such as the sciences, engineering and computer technology. 
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It ought to be the goal of mathematics educators firstly, to 
ensure as far as possible, that all students come to an 
understanding of the nature of mathematics, its evolution and 
cultural significances; and secondly, to prepare, through 
the expertise of specialist mathematics teachers, that 
community of scholars which contains the practitioners of 
the future in the new mathematical practice. 
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